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Abstract: 
 
In recent years, and particularly perhaps since the ‘battle of Seattle’ in 1999, the issue of civil society 
participation in trade policy has attracted increasing policy and academic attention. Much of this 
attention has been drawn to the question of institutional access and channels of participation and 
representation within the WTO. The challenge is one that has faced other global institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF for a number of years (O’Brien et al 2000).  
 
Improving the transparency of and access to decision-making in the context of up-scaling civil society 
participation is not exclusively a global challenge, however. There has been a great deal of activity at the 
regional level around trade negotiations and increasingly in Latin America with the FTAA (Free Trade 
Area of the Americas) following in the wake of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and 
Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur). Few institutional reforms have been brought about without 
significant pressure from civil society, however. Some challenges are common to all movements 
attempting to participate and make their voice heard in the sensitive and traditionally closed arena of 
trade negotiations. But others are unique, and reflect distinct regional political histories, previous 
experiences of mobilisation and prevailing social and material realities. Given this, it becomes important 
to understand what can be learned from the experience of a globally significant region like Latin America 
about the possibilities and limitations of civil society participation in trade policy. 
 
By comparing the documented experiences of NAFTA with analysis of Mercosur and the evolving 
FTAA negotiations, in terms of the participation of the environmental movements, important insights 
may be gained about: who is participating in trade policy, how and with what effect and, equally 
importantly, who is not participating and what are the implications of this?  
 
The analysis will therefore attempt to identify key factors which shape these dynamics. These include; 
 
• key strategic issues within the movements and among groups themselves (diversity of strategies, 
politics of coalition-building, patterns of influence and engagement/non-engagement)  
• the organisation of institutional access (rights, representation, process, decision-making) 
• key economic and political regional dynamics which affect each of the above (differences between 
and within individual countries regarding key issues and attitudes towards participation) 
 
By comparing across different sets of trade negotiations and institutional arrangements it will be possible 
to identify what the key drivers and shapers of change appear to be. In other words, the extent to which 
these appear to derive from the nature of the institution or process itself, the strategies of the movement 
engaging with it, or more likely still, some combination of both these elements. The challenge is to 
account for diverse forms of engagement and non-engagement and, more importantly, to derive lessons 
from them about the possibility of constructing more effective, sustainable and transparent mechanisms 
of participation and representation in trade policy based on experiences to date in Latin America.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The challenge, identified above, has risen to prominence in global, and increasingly 
also regional politics within Latin America, as a result of a series of complex, but 
inter-related, reasons. Firstly, involving civil society actors in economic policy can be 
seen on one level as a legitimating exercise in the face of powerful critiques about the 
secrecy in which key decisions regarding trade and investment get taken. Such critiques 
are lent greater moral force by growing evidence of the social and economic 
inequalities and environmental damage that flows from decision-making processes on 
these issues conceived in narrow economic terms alone. These claims have been 
articulated most vociferously by the anti-globalisation movement, but resonate with 
deeper social concerns about who is benefiting from globalisation and who is bearing 
the costs of the process. Governments have sought to make the case that globalisation, 
and trade liberalisation in particular, is good for the poor. ‘Managing’ globalisation 
through strong institutions responsive to diverse societal actors is seen to key to 
ensuring that these benefits are realised (DfiD 2000; Newell et al 2002). In this sense, 
institutionalised public participation is seen as an important vehicle by which states can 
defend their claims to represent a broad notion of the public interest (Albán 2003). As 
Deere and Esty note (2002:6) ‘Public understanding and acceptance of the benefits, 
tradeoffs, risks and consequences of different policy proposals is essential’, especially 
perhaps because the public, some publics more than others, will be expected to bear the 
costs of adjustments and realities under new market conditions. 
  
Closely related to legitimacy, is transparency in respect to decision-making. Key to 
public trust is evidence that governments’ policies reflect a careful consideration of 
issues including non-economic social and environmental concerns, for example and are 
not merely designed to serve special interests. There is an important distinction here 
between popular participation and the participation of organised civil society (Albán 
2003), where with the latter important issues of accountability arise and need to be 
addressed if civil society actors are not also to be regarded as just another cadre of 
special interests. 
 
Instrumentally too, an informed public and open debate is said to help raise key issues 
and to ensure that non-trade issues are brought into the negotiations. Participation can 
allow for more complete information and priority-setting and therefore better quality 
decision-making. CSOs can inject new ideas, specialised expertise and lend technical 
support to delegations lacking capacity. There is also a complementary role for citizen 
participation in monitoring and enforcement, filling gaps left by governments and 
regional bodies (Caldwell 2002). The emphasis on ‘due process’ also comes down then 
to the fact that ‘while public scrutiny may make government officials uncomfortable, 
openness and procedural inclusiveness are essential to good public decision-making’ 
(Deere and Esty 2002:333).  
 
Perhaps most crucially, from a strategic point of view, the involvement of NGOs can 
help to ‘build public support for the trade agreement that emerges. By engaging their 
parliaments and the public in the formulation of national trade policy objectives, trade 
negotiators can develop trade initiatives with a clear sense of the standards and 
benchmarks which legislators and the public expect them to meet’ (Fisher 2002:191). 
This also makes it more likely, therefore, that NGOs will provide much needed support 
to get accords through national parliaments, as well as help to monitor the 
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implementation of agreements (CIECA 2002). 
 
Public participation is also an obligation enshrined in many multilateral agreements. In 
the environmental context, international impulses towards public participation derive 
from agreements such as principle 10 of the Rio Declaration of 1992, as well as 
individual multilateral environmental agreements to which many Latin American 
countries are party. They emphasise public consultation and participation, as well as 
access to information.1 Civil society organisations themselves often invoke the right to 
participation before, during and after negotiations towards free trade agreements in the 
phases of design, implementation and evaluation (ONGs Chilenos 2003; CIECA 2002). 
The experience of environmentalists from Latin America in engaging with their 
governments around the Rio process was a mixed one, however, with highly uneven 
degrees of access to governments and receptivity to their positions (Friedman et al 
2001). Beyond access to negotiators, the broader claim to participation is that those 
whose lives are affected by trade policy have a right to a role in the process of designing 
those policies (Brock and McGee 2004). The Alianza Social Continental (ASC) has 
claimed as one of its mobilising rationales in this regard, ‘the desire to stop being 
merely spectators in a game that affects all our lives but is played only by people with 
the power and money, to determine our own destiny’ (Púlsar 2001: my translation). 
 
The WTO experience 
 
The challenge(s) I engage with here is that which trade negotiators at the WTO, 
including many Latin American countries of course, have faced for a long time. For this 
reason, it is worth summarising, for a moment, some of the key issues that have 
emerged in this context. The WTO has evolved a relationship with civil society where 
NGOs (not broader social movements), particularly those ‘concerned with matters 
related to those of the WTO’, are regarded as a ‘valuable resource’ that ‘can contribute 
to the accuracy and richness of the public debate’, that can ‘increase the awareness of 
the public in respect of WTO activities’. Allowing them to fulfil this role requires 
members to improve transparency and communication with NGOs, making 
information available more rapidly and improving public access to documents through 
the internet. This is in addition to ‘the organisation of ad hoc symposia on specific 
WTO-related issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish 
to make available for consultation by interested delegates and the continuation of past 
practice of responding to requests for general information and briefings about the 
WTO’.2 The danger with this model, as Wilkinson notes, citing Marceau and Pedersen, 
is that symposia serve as ‘a useful arms-length exercise in NGO-WTO relations with 
the secretariat serving as a ‘buffer’ between Members and NGOs’ (2002:203).  
 
There remains limited scope for institutionalised forms of engagement by civil society 
groups. Item 5 of the same declaration makes clear that ‘If chairpersons of WTO 
councils and committees participate in discussions or meetings with NGOs it shall be in 
their personal capacity unless that particular council or committee decides otherwise’. 
Wilkinson (2002:204) rightly suggests that this means ‘NGOs are unable officially to 
                                                          
1  See Glover et al (2002) for more on national experiences of meeting such commitments in 
Mexico and Brazil, among others, in the context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
2 WTO ‘Guidelines for arrangements on relations with NGOs’ document WT/L/162, July 18th 
1996 
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influence WTO policy'. More bluntly still, item 6 states;  
 
‘As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would 
not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its 
meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met 
constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where lies primary 
responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are 
brought to bear on trade policy-making.’  
 
Not only then are NGOs not be involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings, but 
there are guards in place to secure the essentially inter-governmental nature of WTO 
decision-making. Where interaction does have to take place, the emphasis is clearly on 
organised elements of civil society with, what the WTO would define, as a legitimate 
interest in its work. As Wilkinson argues ‘The emphasis is on the development of 
relations with NGOs, rather than with the more informal, less well organised tracts of 
public opinion. And, by committing itself to court only those willing to engage with the 
WTO, large sections of more critical public opinion are marginalised’ (2002:204). 
 
Even for organised civil society with relevant expertise, there are many barriers to 
effective participation. For example, although the Appellate body allowed NGOs to 
submit amicus briefs to panels and appellate bodies, broader forms of participation 
from independent experts have not thus far been permitted. Moreover, panels and the 
appellate body continue to meet behind closed doors and submissions of parties are not 
automatically made available to non-participants (Williams 2001a). Williams notes 
elsewhere that while;  
 
‘The earlier closure of the WTO process to non-corporate actors has been tempered.. 
the venue still privileges those who possess structural power, granting them superior 
instrumental access. While the WTO has progressively expanded access to 
non-governmental organisations, the fact that the organisation includes business groups 
in the NGO category reinforces the influence of the corporate sector in the policy 
process’ (2001b:46). 
 
There is clearly then a great deal of relevant experience with these issues within global 
trade fora. There are though, specific challenges for Latin America. In large parts of the 
region, democratic processes remain, in historical terms, relatively new. Friedman et al 
argue (2001:32); ‘regional dynamics have a profound impact on participation in global 
civil society. The contention among NGOs over the most effective use of energy and 
resources can easily be traced to a history of confrontation between civil society and the 
state in Latin America and to uncertainties about the extent of democratization’. At an 
institutional and regional level, the challenge of participation is also a relatively new 
one, despite the existence of mechanisms for consultation with business and labour 
within the Andean Pact and a permanent consultative committee within el Sistema de la 
Integración Centroamericana, for example (Botto and Tussie 2003:31).  
 
There is a strong sense, however, in which NAFTA definitively broke with previous 
models of thinking about participation in trade policy in the region (ibid:33). ALCA 
opens up the possibility of extending this change across the whole hemisphere. 
However, as Deere and Esty (2002:6) suggest ‘Within Latin America, numerous calls 
for greater public dialogue on potential trade and environment issues in the FTAA 
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context have gone unheeded by many governments’. Ministerial statements from the 
summits have called for mechanisms for incorporating non-governmental views other 
than business through consultation and dialogue (ALCA 2004), but there is a gap 
between the rhetoric and the reality with many Latin American governments actively 
resisting attempts to open up trade decision-making to greater input from civil society.  
 
There are a complex set of historical and political reasons for this suspicion regarding 
the participation of civil society actors in trade policy in Latin America. Besides the 
Mexican government’s bitter experience of the NAFTA negotiations, which I discuss 
below, Botto and Tussie (2003:36) also observe a prevailing fear about loss of 
competence or sovereignty for decision-making in this area. This relates to a concern 
that the numerical and financial superiority of organised civil society in North America 
would serve to compound existing under-representation of less developed countries 
within the region in trade negotiations with their more powerful counterparts. With the 
exception of Mercosur, many of the initiatives for the inclusion of civil society actors in 
trade negotiating processes within the region have come from North American 
governments, a path set most clearly by the Clinton administration in the context of the 
NAFTA negotiations. Despite this, there is a now a rich history of experience within 
Latin America around these issues which is worth sharing with a broader audience. 
Questions remain about well key lessons are being effectively learned, even by those 
involved in the ongoing negotiations. Despite a continued lack of participation in the 
ALCA negotiations, for example, Deere and Esty (2002:18) suggest ‘a clear lesson 
from the NAFTA experience is that civil society and domestic private-sector actors are 
essential partners for governments faced with the challenge of advancing trade 
objectives and environmental priorities simultaneously’.  
 
2. Towards a framework for analysis 
 
The purpose of this section is not to review all literatures that are potentially relevant to 
our enquiry here. Rather, it is to identify key insights from important bodies of work 
that help us to make sense of the patterns of mobilisation and participation I describe in 
the sections which follow.  
 
Social Movements 
 
Much of the social movement literature in general, and in relation to Latin America 
specifically, focuses on groups and struggles that are in many ways outside the formal 
arenas of political bargaining that are the subject of our analysis here, even if they react 
to and define themselves in opposition to those processes. This is partly explained by 
the fact many Latin American NGOs began to organise and mobilise under, and in 
opposition to, authoritarian rule. As Friedman et al (2001:11) note; ‘This common 
formative experience shaped the actions and attitudes of the groups profoundly, not 
least in their shared ambivalence toward cooperation with the state’. Elements of such 
work nevertheless help us to understand the forms of mobilisation taking place around 
ALCA for example, or that preceded and continue to characterise the NAFTA and 
Mercosur negotiations. They shed light on the organising strategies of ‘outsiders’ in 
trade debates, though as we will see below, these forms of mobilisation and 
non-engagement also interact with and shape the politics of bargaining between states 
and those elements of civil society within formal negotiating arenas.  
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Early work on social movements with Latin America during the 1970s was oriented 
towards the radical agendas of left intellectuals concerned with the revolutionary 
potential of those movements to overthrow the capitalist state. As Haber notes, at this 
time, ‘environmental and women’s movements were assessed in terms of their assault 
on capitalism and the capitalist state, whether or not they saw themselves in those 
terms’ (1997:127). Perhaps slightly exaggerating the case, Petras and Morley 
(1990:158) claim; ‘practically all of the significant political changes that took place in 
Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s were the direct or indirect result of massive 
social movements and not of electoral processes or militarized guerrilla movements’. 
Through the 1980s and 1990s interest has grown in new social movements and different 
ways of understanding their relevance to political life. There has been significant 
interest, for example, in high-profile movements such as the urban squatters in Chile 
and Peru (pobladores and barriadas), the madres de la plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the 
Zapatistas in Mexcio and the Movement of the Landless (MST) in Brazil. More 
recently, the focus has been more on the democratising potential of social movements 
in Latin America; the extent to which they can sustain and deepen the transitions to 
democracy witnessed across the region since the 1970s, as well as their role in 
constructing alternative politics or new visions of development (Alvarez et al 1998; 
Jacobs 2002). There is danger here of romanticising Latin American social movements 
(Roberts 1997), but the point is that they have been a crucial element in the changing 
landscape of Latin American politics such that the politics of regional economic 
integration can be expected to be cast in their light.  
 
Different academic traditions are employed in these literatures to make sense of the 
movements from Marxist and Gramscian analysis emphasising class politics and the 
(re)production of hegemony (Petras and Morley 1990) to more postmodern readings 
which emphasise identify and knowledge politics and the need to capture power not 
solely in terms of ability to change institutional behaviour, and not driven entirely by 
material concerns (Alvarez et al 1998). More recently, the role of movements in 
responding to the limits of state capacity to deliver basic human needs and to cope with 
the fall-out of economic crisis and the social dislocation it produces has provided 
another rich vein of enquiry, particularly of course focused on Argentina (Auyero 2003; 
Almeyra 2004; Bombal 2003). This is particularly important given the general finding 
that changing economic relations make new forms of protest politics possible, even if 
the form of protest chosen and the elite response to such protest play out differently in 
different country settings (Faber 1997:128). 
 
Influence and impact 
 
In thinking about influence and what enables movements and NGOs to be more or less 
successful, again there are wide-ranging debates and literatures that I cannot attempt to 
do justice to here. There is nevertheless some consensus around the importance of (i) 
political opportunity structures; the role of formal political institutions in providing 
points of access and channels of influence which shape how groups mobilise and which 
strategies they adopt in order to utilise these (ii) structures of mobilisation; the types of 
organisation, the networks and resources that groups drawn on for collective action (iii) 
framing devices; the meaning civil society groups give to their goals in order to create 
cohesion internally and to communicate their intentions to external actors (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald 1996).  
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Such approaches form part of a growing interest in the transnational dimensions of 
social movements and international networks of protest and collaboration (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003). More activist oriented literatures on 
global citizen action, for example, (Edwards and Gaventa 2001) seek to identify lessons 
about the conditions in which international coalitions are able to impact on the 
operations of regional and global economic actors, suggesting relevance for our 
enquiry here. Some of the key insights are summarised in box 1.  
 
 
Box 1: When global citizen action works 
 
Brown and Fox (2001) suggest groups able to do some the following may have a 
longer-lasting impact;  
 
a) Make the campaign fit the target by using the right tactics, coalitions and 
resources to bring about a particular type of change. Reflecting on IFI campaigns, 
Nelson suggests (2001: 69) ‘NGO influence is focused on a handful of policy 
issues and their victories have come in carefully, strategically chosen campaigns’.  
a) Open up cracks in the system by engaging with allies within the system that may 
also be looking for support for their own positions  
b) Recognise that impact takes different forms and that definitions of success will 
change over time. Brown and Fox suggest (2001:51), ‘Campaigns that do not 
succeed with direct influence may still be considered to have had significant 
impact when measured by more indirect indicators.  
c) Create footholds for others to follow, creating institutional openings and changes 
that will allow other groups to shape change in the future from the earliest stages 
of the policy process.  
d) Address their own accountability to those they claim to represent; beyond NGOs 
as a proxy for civil society.  
e) Address power and communication gaps to build trust and enable quick and 
cohesive responses to changing circumstances.  
f) ‘Key individuals and organisations, acting as bridges in a global network, can 
have influence wildly disproportionate to their wealth or formal power’ (Brown 
and Fox 2001:56). 
 
 
 
On the environmental side, issue specific studies have also sought to assess the impact 
of strategies on negotiations themselves through alliances with sympathetic elements 
within the state, provision of strategically useful information, media-oriented strategies 
of exposure and embarrassment and the forging of connections to key domestic 
political audiences to maintain pressure on ‘lead’ or ‘laggard’ governments (Arts 1998, 
Newell 2000). Within Latin America, some studies have also sought to evaluate the 
effectiveness of ‘Environmental Protection Issue Networks’. Though drawing on links 
to global processes, the focus has tended to be on issues of local environmental 
protection (Rodrigues 2000). The definition of such networks means that they include a 
very broad range of actors beyond the scope of our enquiry here, including elements of 
the state and multinational organisations, the private sector, media and scientific 
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associations, alongside NGOs and grassroots movements (Rodrigues 2000: 127-8).  
 
Assessing the impact of NGO participation on trade policy presents a fraught task, 
however. It implies all the familiar problems of mistaking correlation (participation in 
trade policy and an outcome favourable to an NGO agenda) with causation (assuming 
that one is directly related to the other), as well as attempting to capture the multiple 
dimensions and forms of power. I do not have space here to explore the intricacies of 
debates about power, but it is worth noting the importance of notions of 
non-decision-making power and anticipated reaction in understanding processes of 
exclusion from decision-making processes, as well as power that operates silently and 
often invisibly, but which nevertheless has an impact on policy outcomes (Newell 
2000). 
 
Charting the influence of civil society groups on trade policy also has to be placed in a 
context of the counter-veiling influence of actors opposed to their positions. Power is of 
course relative, and political economy or structural accounts would expect that business 
leaders and representatives of regional and global capital enjoy privileged access and 
representation within trade negotiations. Many observers have noted the 
disproportionate degree of access and influence for business groups in trade talks in 
Latin America (Hochstetler 2003). Their input has been organised through coalitions 
such as the Foro Empresarial de las Américas and the Red Empresarial para la 
Integración Hemisférica, a key mechanism for attempting to demonstrate a 
transnational interest in market liberalisation that transgressed specific sectoral and 
national concerns (Botto and Tussie 2003). Though such activities have not been the 
focus of our analysis, it is useful to mention the influence of business actors, both 
because in some accounts they are considered part of civil society (at least as organised 
political actors) and therefore make use of, and are shaped by, many of the same 
institutional channels that guide civil society involvement in general, and because 
cross-referencing serves to highlight some key differences in the resources, access and 
influence of business compared with other civil society actors.  
 
Insights from these literatures need to be adapted to resonate with the contemporary 
regional realities of Latin America to reflect, for example, the growth of political 
opportunity structures at regional level and the growing density of transnational links 
which can serve to amplify the voice of movements in the region within other 
decision-making fora (Hochstetler 2003a). Clearly, the challenges of effectively 
making use of political opportunity structures, of mobilising effectively and of framing 
campaigns in ways which resonate with diverse publics across the region, are 
magnified when we scale-up to regional trade arenas.  
 
The uniqueness of trade policy 
 
There is also something unique about the trade policy process which we need to take 
account of in thinking about the possibilities for civil society engagement. Brock and 
McGee (2004) summarise these challenges in terms of (i) structural complexity and 
inequities (ii) the exclusion of alternatives to trade liberalisation narratives and (iii) the 
dynamics of representation. Trade policy produces different forms of politics and 
creates unique political opportunity structures. The policy-making process on a 
‘high-politics’ issue such as trade has tended to be much more secretive and less 
accessible to non-state actors, particularly NGOs that often have fewer established ties 
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and points of access to these ministries overseeing trade policy. Within Latin America, 
the process has been led by national ministers and ministries of foreign affairs and 
economy through bodies like Mercosur’s Consejo del Mercado Común. In this sense, 
there has been less access for NGOs to trade policy compared with many other 
international and regional bodies in issue areas where entitlements to make statements, 
access to delegations, and availability of information are routine expectations. Instead, 
private meetings and ‘flexible’ decision-making processes are often a euphemism for ‘a 
system of governance deeply flawed by lack of transparency and accountability’ 
(Brock and McGee 2004:8). 
 
Trade negotiations are characterised by a great deal of bilateral bargaining over 
reciprocal measures on commercially sensitive issues and there is less emphasis on 
plenary-based open negotiation compared with other issue areas. Brock and McGee 
note; ‘trade policy-making entails many trade-offs at national and international levels 
that would necessarily constrain the scope for conceding to specific demands made by 
any poor person or group’ (2004:5). There are also high requirements for legal and 
economic expertise that many NGOs are not well placed to provide. The highly 
technical nature of the negotiations also heightens the challenge of using traditional 
campaigning tools such as media work and popular education where the challenge of 
‘demystifying’ is exacerbated.  Meaningful engagement is often further compounded 
by ‘the sealed, ideological homogeneity of knowledge, information and analysis in the 
trade area’ (Brock and McGee 2004:27). As I argue below, perhaps especially with 
trade policy, these factors place a high premium on national political arenas to make a 
difference and hence individual state-civil society complexes become key. 
 
The disparities in resources between trade negotiators and those seeking to influence 
them is also clearly key. Cavanagh argues ‘To negotiate NAFTA, the three 
governments devoted millions of dollars to infrastructure. They had top-level 
translators and interpreters. They had hundreds of people freed from other duties for the 
process. As citizen groups, we are still in the beginning stages of developing such an 
infrastructure’ (Cavanagh et al 2001:158). In terms of understanding the competing 
pressures on governments in relation to trade policy, it is also important to 
acknowledge the pressure exercised by other global economic agents such as the World 
Bank and IMF towards market opening and trade liberalisation. This broader politics of 
aid and debt has been shown to have an important effect on the ‘negotiating space’ of 
developing countries when ‘Broad cooperation agreements between wealthy and 
developing countries often relate aid and trade’ (Brock and McGee 2003:15). For those 
CSOs with good access to departments of development or overseas aid, this can of 
course provide an indirect entry point for exercising influence over trade policy, but it 
also often serves to close off opportunities for challenging the current direction of trade 
policy. 
 
Regarding links between trade and environmental policy in developing countries, 
Hochstetler (2003:2) highlights a number of factors which mean that ‘politicians can 
normally assume that they can negotiate trade openings without needing to take steps to 
appease an environmentally based opposition coalition’. Underpinning this of course, 
is the prevailing suspicion that environmental standards require costly changes in 
production processes that will reduce their competitiveness. Industry groups rarely 
miss the opportunity to fan this fear in resisting calls for environmental provisions. As 
discussed below, this dynamic takes on a regional dimension in so far as Brazil has 
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comparatively higher environmental standards and capacity than Uruguay, Paraguay 
and Argentina within Mercosur and the U.S and Canada than Mexico in the context of 
NAFTA and ALCA. 
  
3. Environmental provisions within the agreements: Brief history and context 
 
NAFTA 
 
The NAFTA agreement has perhaps generated the most interest because of its 
environmental clause and is the most high profile of the regional trade regimes because 
of the involvement of the US and Canada. Critics envisaged a scenario in which lower 
environmental standards in Mexico would attract polluting industries in the US and 
Canada towards Mexico and that harmonisation of standards would pull Canadian and 
US levels down to an inferior common denominator dictated by the less demanding 
nature of Mexican rules (Schatan 2000:167). 
 
The NAFTA environmental side agreement, one of the most sensitive issues in the 
NAFTA negotiations, was aimed at countering these fears that pollution-intensive 
industries would relocate to the Maquiladora area on the Mexican side of the border. 
Indeed, President Clinton made support for NAFTA conditional on the conclusion of an 
environmental side agreement. The agreement is meant to ensure an upward 
harmonisation of environmental standards so that a country can set the standard it 
considers most appropriate for achieving the level of protection it desires, even if these 
are stricter than those established internationally (Schatan 2000). Formally, companies 
are also required to return production waste back to country of origin, but the NAFTA 
rule of national treatment meant companies could dispose of waste according to 
Mexican environment laws where there is concern that monitoring and enforcement is 
weak. In one survey, more than a quarter of companies said stronger environmental 
provisions in the US prompted them to relocate in Mexico (French 1993) and according 
to Mexico’s secretariat of Urban Planning and Ecology more than half the 
Macquiladora plants produce hazardous waste and while waste is supposed to be 
transferred to the US, ‘compliance has been the exception rather than the rule’ 
(LeQuesne 1996:68).  
 
Despite the fact that an environmental commission was established to provide periodic 
reporting on the state of the environment and the impact of the NAFTA agreement in 
particular, sanctions against persistent violators of legislation are seen as a last resort. 
Indeed, at the end of 1995 the US Congress threatened to reject ‘fast-track’ authority for 
the incorporation of new countries into NAFTA unless sanctions were removed from 
the Side-Agreements. Instead, the North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation is empowered to summon technical advisers, mediate and make 
recommendations to parties aimed at finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the 
dispute.  
 
Where a party is not implementing its own environmental laws effectively, it can be 
taken to dispute settlement through a complex process whereby the complainant (which 
can include communities threatened by a violation of environmental law) has to prove 
systematic non-implementation according to weakly defined criteria, after which the 
country is required to pay a fine where there is evidence of a ‘persistent pattern of 
failure to effectively enforce its environmental law’ (Article 22). Alongside this, 
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however, is a provision which determines that standards can be challenged if it is felt 
that they negatively impact trade and do not employ recognised risk assessment and 
‘sound science’ criteria. Finally, as a further sop to critics and to pacify concerns about 
the potential for environmental deregulation, there are guidelines for environmentally 
responsible business investment. Article 114 of the ESA attempts to invalidate the 
relaxing of health, safety or environmental measures in order to attract investors and the 
NAFTA agreement also provides that international environmental agreements 
recognised by the three parties should take precedence over national rules. Where there 
is conflict between NAFTA and an MEA the latter prevails. Audley notes (1997:141) in 
this regard that ‘given the dominance of trade over the environment, the environmental 
provisions found in the NAFTA package are quite incredible’.  
 
Limitations of environmental provisions within NAFTA from an environmental point 
of view include the fact that environmental concerns can only be raised with a party 
when a trade link exists; the scope of  ‘environmental’ is restricted to traditional 
pollution control measures; the fact that lowering standards to attract foreign 
investment, though forbidden in the agreement, does not incur sanctions; key 
environmental principles such as polluter pays are not incorporated into the agreement 
and, like the WTO, standards cannot be process-based (Schatan 2000). Hogenboom 
(1998:250) claims in this regard, that the debate’s narrow focus was partly caused by 
the strategy of the moderate wing of the US environmental movement in accepting the 
narrow environmental approach of the three governments and denouncing proposals by 
critical organisations for a North American development initiative which would 
comprehensively deal with environmental issues. 
 
Mercosur 
 
By contrast, the debate on the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
environmental protection within Mercosur in Latin America is less well advanced. 
Mercosur developed in a two-stage process; a transition period until 1994 when tariffs 
were removed from 85% of regional trade and then, in 1995, it became a customs union 
with an agreed Common External Tariff (Curtis 2001). The agreement includes 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as full members and Bolivia and Chile as 
associate members. The four member states signed the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. 
 
The incorporation of environmental issues has been weak and sporadic at best (Onestini 
1999), despite the fact that Asunción treaty that brought Mercosur into being lists 
regional quality of life and sustainable development amongst its broader aims. Efforts 
to negotiate a environmental legal agreement for Mercosur look a decade (1991-2001) 
reflecting a combination of regulatory competition, the weakness of environmental 
groups and the correspondingly high levels of influence exercised by business actors. 
Mercosur’s environmental agency has a weak institutional status and a limited agenda, 
reflecting perhaps the low levels of institutionalisation that characterise Mercosur as a 
whole. While there is a technical sub-committee (REMA- Reunión Especializada de 
Medio Ambiente), created in 1992, which looks at non-tariff restrictions, international 
norms (ISO 14001), labelling (a possible Mercosur eco-label) and the provision of 
information about countries’ environmental legislation and joint impact assessments, it 
focuses only on trade-related aspects of environmental policies. The aim has been to 
eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade applied for environmental reasons by harmonising 
PPMs, expressed in the form of non-binding directives. There is no broader remit for its 
 12 
 
 
work, for example with regard the environmental impact of trade liberalisation, and 
environmental standards are viewed as barriers to trade in potential conflict with the 
goals of trade liberalisation that drive the Mercosur project. Business groups such as 
CEADS (Argentine Business Council for Sustainable Development) have lent their 
support to such initiatives, aimed at harmonising environmental standards and 
removing potential barriers to trade (Agüero 2002). 
 
Since 1995, REMA has met as the environment working group (SGT6), about four 
times annually. The working group has, according to Hochstetler (2003:12), ‘been 
unable to make environmental issues a significant component of the Mercosur process’. 
It has far less formal power in comparison to the environmental institutions that exist 
within NAFTA, described above. REMA was initially not established as a formal sub 
group but instead as a temporary conference of environmental ministers and academics. 
This early informality reduced the impact it had on the agreement as a whole. This 
weakness is compounded by the fact that the dispute resolution process of the Mercosur 
is unavailable for environmental disputes, so REMA had no means for enforcement 
(Blum 2000). It also operated without the active engagement of civil society, which 
only started to mobilise actively around trade and environment themes from 1995 
(CEDA 2002).  
 
In 2001, the Mercosur Environmental Framework Agreement was signed in a form far 
less ambitious and expansive than the 1996 protocol version. The protocol to the 
Asunción Treaty is essentially an expanded re-articulation of earlier non-binding 
directives (Tussie and Vásquez 2000). This may in part reflect that, as Tussie and 
Vásquez note, Mercosur’s path ‘is mainly drawn up by agreements between the 
government and the private sector with little input from other actors in the society’ 
(2000:188). It may also reflect the fact that none of the Mercosur countries has yet 
adopted domestic rules for industry location from an environmental policy perspective 
and common minimal environmental requirements may be difficult to develop given 
that attracting investment is the driving rationale for Mercosur.  
 
There are also issues around the broader ‘ecological footprint’ of Mercosur. If the 
infrastructural developments proposed for the region in order to enhance integration are 
not managed responsibly, the environmental consequences could be devastating. For 
example, the Inter-American Development Bank has identified a mixture of transport, 
hydroelectric power projects and gas pipelines as essential foundations of an 
infrastructure for integration (Onestini 1999). Interesting, however, reflecting Brock 
and McGee’s observation (2004) that development and aid policy may provide more 
(indirect) routes into trade policy than pursuing change through trade institutions alone, 
NGOs helped to successfully encourage the IDB to withdraw funding for the 
controversial hidrovia proposal to construct a water superhighway to be built on the 
River Plate system. The provision of alternative environmental and economic 
assessments and a legal case brought by coalitions of opponents in Brazil and Argentina 
and backed by the Brazilian government were key to the successful stalling of this 
Mercosur initiative (Hochstetler 2003). 
 
In many ways, the environment remains a side issue in Mercosur, despite early 
declarations professing a commitment to sustainable development and the desire to 
reconcile the goals of growth and efficiency with environmental protection. The 
window of opportunity that existed to adopt environmental measures seriously has not 
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been exploited (Tussie and Vasquez 2000a:129). At best, Mercosur should be regarded 
as a ‘potential coordinating mechanism for environmental upgrading rather than as the 
up-grader itself’ (ibid:202). At worst, as Hochstetler (2003) notes, environmental 
provisions within Mercosur have actually been downgraded over the course of the 
agreement. There has been little collective acceptance of any environmental provisions 
that are not already held by three of the four countries (Hochstetler 2003). 
 
ALCA 
 
ALCA, (FTAA), surpasses the previous two agreements in its potential breadth and 
ambition, with some suggesting that Mercosur could be absorbed within ALCA 
(Carranza 2003). As Fisher puts it; ‘As we begin the new century, negotiators are 
looking ahead to one of the most demanding trade negotiations in history: the goal is a 
comprehensive agreement linking 34 countries and 800 million people from the Arctic 
Ocean to Tierra del Fuego’ (Fisher 2002:183). For many, ALCA should be understood 
as a continent wide extension of the basic terms and conditions of NAFTA (Teubal and 
Rodriguez 2002), hence the caricature that activists use of ‘NAFTA on steroids’, or 
perhaps more diplomatically ‘NAFTA-plus’ (Brock and McGee 2004:12). Because of 
the requirement for political coordination at continental level, critics suggest ALCA 
could imply ‘the institutionalisation of strategies of neo-liberalism and structural 
adjustment across the whole continent. It produces through these means the 
institutionalisation of a type of economic and social discipline’ in a way which serves 
the interests of large corporations and the government of the US (Teubal and Rodriguez 
2002:174 [my translation]). 
 
It is certainly true that the ALCA project was conceived by the US government. At the 
end of 1994, the heads of government of the Americas (with the notable exception of 
Cuba) produced a declaration expressing their desire to initiate negotiations towards an 
ALCA to be concluded before 2006. The negotiations only began in April 1998, three 
and half years later. In Quebec City in 2001, negotiators presented the first draft of the 
text of an agreement. Rather like Mercosur and NAFTA before them, many activists are 
critical of the way in which the negotiations have been conducted ‘in secret’ (Acción 
Ecológica 2004). This is despite the fact that some claim ‘The FTAA process has been 
conducted with rather more transparency than was the case with NAFTA’ (Brock and 
McGee 2004:12). 
 
The proposed FTAA will address every major industry, commodity and trade issue. So 
far, a series of commissions have been established in areas of key relevance to the 
environment such as agriculture and intellectual property rights. Agriculture was 
considered so important a sector for negotiation that not only does it have a special 
commission, but it is also covered by the work of other commissions on subsidies, 
antidumping and compensation rights. Liberalisation of services also includes 
‘environmental services’ such as water, controversial in light of the experience to date 
of water privatisation of water in countries such as Argentina and Bolivia (Finger 
2005). The national treatment provisions are what concern many activists, where 
companies from all countries in the region will be afforded the same entitlement to 
provide services on a commercial basis. Also, it is alleged quotas or prohibitions on the 
export of resources such as water for environmental reasons will be considered 
protectionist (Acción Ecológica 2004 [my translation]).  
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At ALCA meetings in Buenos Aires and Quebec there have been explicit 
inter-governmental statements in support of the trade in GMOs, prompting concerns 
among activists that ALCA will provide a back door route to spreading the use of 
GMOs in the region (Global Exchange ud). This would be against the expressed 
reservations of countries like Bolivia, and driven by the need to find new markets for 
US, Canada and Argentina, the world’s three largest producers and exporters of GM 
produce rejected in Europe and parts of Asia. This issue has been raised by campesino 
groups in countries that serve as centres of origin for key crops such as maize, like 
Mexico, a country which has already experienced contamination of non-GM crops by 
transgenic varieties. The same groups have registered concern that IPR provisions 
within ALCA might continentalize North American patenting provisions, over-riding 
collective communal and indigenous peoples’ rights (Acción Ecológica 2004). This 
forms part of a broader platform of opposition to biopiracy and the protection of 
indigenous knowledge, an issue of particular importance in Latin America given the 
richness and extent of its biodiversity. 
 
ALCA negotiators have been divided on the role of environmental provisions with the 
agreement. Gitli and Murillo (2002: 156-7) describe three loosely defined positions on 
the appropriate relationship between trade and environment within ALCA. There is the 
U.S on one end of the spectrum in support of environmental provisions, Mexico, 
Central America and the Andean community on the other end, roundly opposed to their 
inclusion, and a group in the middle who might consider environmental provisions 
depending on what they contained, involving Canada, Chile and Mercosur. These 
positions are not, of course, static. There are differences within governments, which 
create openings for new alliances between groups from civil society and government 
departments. Mexican negotiators involved in the NAFTA negotiations that felt forced 
to ‘swallow’ environmental provisions, have been active in their opposition to linking 
environmental considerations with trade commitments (Deere and Esty 2002). Yet 
President Fox of Mexico appointed Victor Lichtinger as head of the Secretaría de 
Medio Ambiente y Resursos Naturales, who has affirmed the importance of the 
interface between trade and environment issues. As Deere and Esty put it however, 
(2002:2) ‘The question remains whether trade officials at Mexico’s Secretaría de 
Economia will ultimately be convinced by Lichtinger’s logic and advance a 
forward-looking trade and environment agenda’. In addition, nearly all Latin American 
governments have adopted the Mexican stance against developing an environmental 
agenda as part of the ALCA negotiations, a position made clear at the ministerial 
meeting in Miami, November 2003 (Ricco 2004).  
 
Many contend, however, drawing on the experience of NAFTA in particular, that an 
agreement with environmental provisions would be a precondition for acceptance by 
North American governments. During the Quebec summit in July 2003, Canada 
presented ALCA negotiators with a concept proposal broaching the issue of 
environmental provisions in the ALCA trade talks (Ricco 2004). Though controversial, 
as Hochstetler (2003:4) puts it; ‘the domestic politics of trade agreements in 
industrialised regions preclude new trade agreements that do not include environmental 
provisions, …civil society groups and their congressional allies in North America will 
block the FTAA in particular under such conditions.’ On this basis, some have called 
for provisions that draw on NAFTA’s Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
including defined mechanisms for individuals and organisations to submit issues and a 
citizen’s advisory committee. These would go far beyond the provisions within 
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Mercosur which, as I have described, are limited to informal provisions for making 
presentations. As Hochstetler (2003:25) suggests; ‘Considering how little autonomy 
Mercosur decision makers grant their own national environmental agencies in a 
regional setting, they are unlikely to agree to grant such freedom of action to citizens 
across the hemisphere and an independent bureaucracy’.   
 
4. The Politics of Mobilisation 
 
This section seeks to explore the forms of mobilisation within the environmental 
movement, and to a lesser extent, campesino movements, around each of the three key 
trade agreements. Who was mobilising and how, around what sort of issues and how 
did the coalitions formed change over time? The aim is to generate insights into how 
groups claim rights to participation, and prepare themselves to make use of those 
spaces that exist within trade policy arenas (described in the next section) or protest 
either the lack of such spaces or the limits imposed by the ways in which they are 
currently constituted. 
 
The NAFTA 3  agreement and its handling of environmental issues generated 
significant, though uneven, degrees of mobilisation by environmental groups in each of 
the three countries party to the agreement. The emergence of transnational relations 
between ENGOs in Mexico, the U.S and Canada was, in many ways, unprecedented. 
Initially, this was centred around collaboration between border organisations in the U.S 
and Mexico,4 but developed well beyond this. Hence, though impacting directly a 
smaller number of countries within the region, the novelty of the process and the ways 
in which the issues being addressed resonated with concerns environmentalists were 
expressing globally regarding pollution havens and the importance of environmental 
protection measures in trade agreements, meant that NAFTA became a site for much 
broader set of struggles. There were nevertheless important differences in structure, 
constituency and strategies that organizations adopted that were, to some extent, 
determined by nationality (Hogenboom 1998:141).  
 
In some cases such differences were a driver of the transnational alliances that were 
formed.5 In Mexico, for example, the lack of openings at state level was an important 
reason for Mexican ENGOs’ alignment with foreign groups ‘which had more political 
clout’ (Hogenboom 1998:147). Mexican groups also relied on counterparts elsewhere 
for access to information about the negotiations, which their own government was 
failing to provide. This was particularly true of more critical groups with less access to 
government. Hogenboom (1998:165) describes the difference in approach as one 
between transnational coalitions that moderate ENGOs were more inclined to 
construct, and transnational alliances that critical groups were more likely to develop. 
She notes, ‘While the transnational relations of moderate groups were limited, 
pragmatic and predominately tied to the political moment of NAFTA negotiations, the 
transnational relations of critical environmental organizations were more profound and 
directed at more structural cooperation’ (1998:165). 
                                                          
3  Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN).  
4  An example here would be the binational ‘Border Health and Environment Network’. 
5  Carranza (2003:90) claims more broadly that it is the fact that groups find it so difficult to 
press their demand at the national level in a context of globalisation that regional forms of civil 
society are taking shape, such as an ‘incipient Mercosur civil society’.  
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RMALC (Mexican Action Network on Free Trade), for example, worked with Action 
Canada Network, the Canadian group ‘Common frontiers’ and the Alliance for 
Responsible Trade and the Citizens Trade Campaign in the U.S. This was in addition to 
the extensive collaboration between border groups, already noted. Such transnational 
ties served to amplify the influence of weaker groups in Mexico that, through 
connections with allies in North America, got to participate in key policy arenas where 
decisions on NAFTA were being taken. This participation took the form of hearings in 
the US Congress which, through exposure in the US, helped to secure access to 
Mexican officials (Hogenboom 1998:152), evidence of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
call the ‘boomerang effect’. For US groups, ties to Mexican groups helped to improve 
their credibility in presenting positions that went beyond their own narrow interests as 
well as permitting them to act as vehicles for transmitting information from the 
‘front-line’ about environmental problems confronting Mexico.  
 
The importance of North-South alliances between activists outside the formal process 
has also been appreciated by activists mobilising around ALCA. Ruben notes 
‘Northern groups recognized …that a strong mobilization in Quito would undermine 
oft-heard claims that people in developing countries are clamouring for free trade while 
only misguided students, angry anarchists and selfish trade unionists stand in the way’ 
(2004:2). This led to the raising of tens of thousands of dollars by activists in Europe 
and North America to enable campesino and indigenous peoples’ movements to attend 
the protest, just as Ecuadorian union members came with the help the U.S-based trade 
union AFL-CIO. In return, movement activists conducted interviews with Northern 
media about the issues they were protesting, organised by their allies in Europe and 
North America. 
 
The process of alliance building has not been without its difficulties. The different 
organisational structures of groups often prove to be a point of contention. In the 
context of NAFTA, the fact that compared with large membership based organisations 
from the US and Canada, many Mexican groups had fewer official members, created 
tensions about how wide a group of citizens were being adequately represented. This 
has been an issue in the ALCA negotiations too, with trade unions in particular 
questioning who NGOs represent, occasionally referring to them in dismissive terms as 
‘non-governmental individuals’. NGOs, in turn, have been critical of the overly 
hierarchical and bureaucratic nature of some trade unions (Korzeniewicz and Smith 
2003:69).  
 
In the NAFTA context, both the scale of funding disparities between groups from 
Mexico and North America and particularly, the extent of corporate funds received by 
the latter, also created suspicions among some Mexican ENGOs about how far those 
groups agendas were influenced by their funding sources; companies that stood to 
benefit from NAFTA (Hogenboom 1998:153-4). Despite these issues, united positions 
were possible, such as the Common Declaration on NAFTA in 1991 issued by a group 
of more than twenty Mexican, US and Canadian ENGOs calling, among other things, 
for the inclusion of environmental issues in NAFTA, a review of the environmental 
effects of NAFTA and the participation of environmental experts in the negotiations. 
 
Though covering a broad range of issues, in their own right, environmental concerns 
featured quite prominently in these coalitions. The point of departure for many of these 
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coalitions was not to claim that NAFTA was responsible for the social and 
environmental problems they were experiencing, but that it was accelerating them. A 
tactic on the part of NAFTA proponents was to characterise those against the plan as 
protectionist, encouraging some groups to demonstrate that they are not against trade 
and investment, but rather in favour of different frameworks of rules. Some went about 
articulating that alternative in the form of the ‘Just and Sustainable Trade and 
Development Initiative for North America’. Following inputs from other groups within 
the region, the agreement was broadened to become ‘Alternatives for the Americas: 
Building a Peoples’ Hemispheric Agreement’, explicitly building in chapters on labour, 
environment and gender.     
 
The timing of NAFTA also made a difference to the issues around which groups 
mobilised. Signed in 1992 and coming into effect in January 1994, the agreement 
emerged at a time of high levels of environmental concern on the back of UNCED in 
1992. With global attention focussed on the way in which NAFTA mediated the 
relationship between trade and environment, greater pressure was felt by those 
negotiating its terms to strengthen environmental provisions. By contrast, ongoing 
negotiations within Mercosur and ALCA have been, to some extent, overshadowed by 
economic crisis within the region (Argentina in 2000/2001 and previously Brazil’s 
massive currency devaluation in January 1999) such that the very project of regional 
integration has been in doubt at key moments (Carranza 2003). The timing of the 
decline in collective environmental provisions under Mercosur is, according to 
Hochstetler (2003: 4) ‘most clearly linked to the severe crisis of the entire Mercosur 
argreement and the Argentine economic crisis in the late 1990s in particular, which had 
little to do with the environmental protocol itself, but contributed to its decline’.  
 
Timing also made a difference in terms of the types of alliance that were possible. 
Coming as it did in the early 1990s, NAFTA managed to bring into loose alliance 
coalitions of labour and environmental interests to combat threats to hard-fought 
regulation. As Obach notes (2004:63); ‘Although unions and environmentalists had 
distinct concerns in regard to NAFTA, the common threat the agreement presented 
created the impetus for labor-environmental cooperation’. At times working 
independently, at other times together, national coalitions were formed that included 
many of the major labour and environmental actors such as the Citizens Trade 
Campaign and the Alliance for Responsible Trade. They also went on to work together 
in opposing fast-track trade authority for the Clinton administration through bodies 
such as the Citizen’s Trade Watch Campaign.  
 
Links with the Unions were beneficial for environmentalists in amplifying their voice 
for a number of reasons. Audley notes ‘the pre-emptive leverage enjoyed by 
environmental groups was …as much a product of their association with other more 
traditionally influential trade actors opposed to NAFTA as it was their own importance 
as a political issue for members of Congress’ (Audley 1997:145). In other words, it was 
the anti-NAFTA labour forces that really challenged NAFTA’s success. This 
opposition from labour created a political incentive for the USTR to engage with an 
interest group ‘they otherwise felt no obligation or political pressure to engage’ 
(Audley 1997:145). Suggesting that the alliance was mutually beneficial, Mayer notes 
(2002:99) ‘The environmental connection helped labour unions broaden their appeal to 
the media and to the general public which often appeared more interested in dramatic 
images of environmental degradation than in the plight of workers’. Araya (2001) 
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suggests, however, that while such alliances were useful for drawing the attention of 
US Congress to these issues, in the context of ALCA, they could serve to compound 
fears that the environmental debate is a convenient cover for protectionist interests.  
 
Though trade negotiations become focal points from cross-sectoral and transnational 
mobilising, it should be made clear that many groups also choose not to engage with 
trade policy processes. This can either be because they are not seen to be relevant to a 
group’s core activities or because financial and/or technical barriers mean that 
mobilising around these issues is not a realistic possibility. Within Mexico, for 
example, the Mexican Ecologist Movement, with good connections to the media, 
largely ‘side-stepped’ the NAFTA issue (Hogenboom 1998:145). There also often 
appears to be a divide between capital city based groups that are more geared to 
addressing national and international policy agendas, and environmental and 
campesino groups based in rural areas that attach a lower priority to these agendas. As 
Hogenboom notes in the context of Mexico, ‘Their distance from the political centre of 
Mexico city, a lack of finance and experience, and poor access to information about 
NAFTA discouraged their participation in the NAFTA debate’ (1998:146).  
 
Insider/Outsider Strategies6 
 
Insiders 
 
We will see below how differences in perspective regarding the relationship between 
trade and environment played out between insider and outsider groups in the context of 
NAFTA within each of the countries party to the agreement. Similar divisions have also 
emerged in the context of the ALCA discussions with some groups adopting a critical 
position within the ASC (la Alianza Social Continental)7 and other groups investing in 
efforts to identify and advance ‘win-win’ linkages between environmental protection 
measures and trade liberalisation.  
 
An example of such a group from the latter category would be the Canadian-based IISD 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development) which, together with the 
international bodies IUCN and UNEP, organised symposia for this purpose. Academic 
leaning environmental NGOs also played a part in trying to forge the contents of a 
common deal on environmental provisions that would be acceptable to all parties to the 
summits, ‘Agenda Ambiental para el ALCA’. The organisations leading this effort 
included the Centro de Investigación y Planificación del Medio Ambiente, Global 
Environment and Trade Study (US) and Centro Internacional de Politíca Económica 
para el Desarallo Sostenible (Costa Rica). Grupo Zapallar was also created in 1999 to 
bring together experts from different sectors and countries of Latin America to 
contribute to a more productive dialogue about trade and sustainable development 
(Bülow 2003:102; CEDA 2002).  
                                                          
6  Rather than a hard and fast distinction, the difference between insider and outsider 
groups and strategies should be seen as a spectrum of roles that groups can move in and 
out of and which change over time (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003). 
7  A number of national environmental groups within Latin America have also come out 
against ALCA. Examples would include the Consejo Professional Analistas 
Ambientales de la República Argentina and Instituto de Ecología Politica (Chile) 
(Bülow 2003:95).  
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One element of this strategy of engagement has been to build bridges with industry. 
Audley (1997:83) notes in the case of NWF, for example, a policy ‘of constructive 
engagement with industry elites convinced them that a dialogue between business and 
responsible environmental organisations could result in effective changes in investment 
patterns and improve the chances for environmental quality through trade.’ Alongside 
engagement with trade negotiators, therefore, lobbying directly those making the 
day-to-day investment decisions that impact upon resource use is also seen to yield 
immediate and positive results. Such strategies may be particularly significant given 
prevailing scepticism, among both governments and the majority of civil society, about 
the possibility of constructing a hemispherical environmental agenda. The preference 
among governments is to promote such issues through the UN or through the forum of 
environmental ministers in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
At the level of implementation, leading American NGOs such as NRDC have taken a 
lead in trying to shape the coordination of proposals coming out of the summit meetings 
by initiating, among other things, bodies such as the Foro Interamericano sobre la 
Legislación Ambiental. Representation on the executive committee of the body is 
meant to be open both to governmental and non-governmental actors such that for 
Bülow (2003:89) it represents another potential mechanism for the participation of civil 
society in policy implementation. Latin American groups less critical of the free trade 
agenda have organised themselves in similar ways. Some more research-oriented 
NGOs, such as FARN (Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) in Argentina, have 
supported efforts towards the harmonisation of environmental protection, producing 
their own analyses of existing legislation and suggesting places for common 
improvement (Hochstetler 2003). They hosted for example the project ‘Environmental 
assessment and capacity building for the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement’, 
coordinated by the Foro Interamericano de Derecho Ambiental within the ambit of the 
OEA (Organización de Estados Americanos) (Walsh et al 2003). This was an attempt to 
assess environmental challenges resulting from the FTAA (amongst other trade 
agreements), pursued through country studies undertaken in collaboration with national 
environmental officials and experts. Domestic policy options were then discussed 
through ‘public/private’ dialogue with government officials (Walsh et al 2003:vii). A 
similar function is performed in Costa Rica by the Grupo Permanente de Análisis sobre 
Integración, Comercio y Ambiente that brings together academics, NGOs and the 
private sector (Gitli and Murillo 2000). Research-oriented groups such as FARN, 
CEDEA (Centro de Estudios Ambientales) (Argentina) and WWF have, therefore, 
engaged in ways which reflect their expertise, attending the key ALCA meetings and 
even being invited to make presentations. In the case of CEDEA, for example, the 
group was invited to present work they have previously undertaken for UNEP on the 
impact of trade liberalisation on the fisheries sector (UNEP 2002; UNEP 2002a). These 
sorts of more technical inputs are clearly more useful and political acceptable to those 
negotiating the agreement.  
 
Sometimes the strategy is aimed at directly engaging the government with a view to 
shaping their negotiating stance. In Mexico in relation to NAFTA, 30 ENGOs 
organised themselves in the Union of Environmental Groups which sought to foster 
positive relations with the Mexican government in order to have a say in Mexico’s 
official position on environmental safeguards in NAFTA (Hogenboom 1998). Despite 
their insider status, aided by the fact that one of UGAM’s advisers was a prominent 
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environmental lawyer, they faced many of the same barriers to effective participation as 
outsiders in terms of poor access to official information and the lack of state capacity to 
handle inputs from civil society. Their input, along with that of organisations such as 
the Group of Hundred, was restricted to some ‘side-room’ discussions during 
negotiations on the supplemental environmental agreement. Rather like CEDEA and 
FARN in Argentina, groups such as Mexico’s INAINE (Autonomous Institute for 
Ecological Research) that carry out technical and scientific research for government 
agencies were invited into government processes and cooperated, on occasion, with 
other groups on the issue of incorporation of environmental measures within NAFTA. 
 
Through their own insider role, many such groups have nevertheless pushed for the 
broadening of participation and the construction of an infrastructure of participation, 
raising such issues as access to information. Rights to participate often presuppose 
rights to know and access to information. This has become a key rallying cry in the 
context of NAFTA. The environmental right-to-know movement in the three countries 
party to the NAFTA agreement has fought to bring Mexico’s Pollution Release and 
Transfer Register in line with those of the US and Canada. If President Fox signs, the 
regulations will make Mexico the first country in Latin America to require public 
disclosure of industrial chemical releases to air, water and land on an annual, site by 
site, chemical-specific basis, ensuring that Mexico lives up to its written commitments 
under the NAFTA environmental side accord (Nauman 2004). This comes on the back 
of efforts by Mexican NGOs writing public letters and carrying out personal visits to 
pressure the Mexican government and subsidiaries of the US and Canadian 
corporations operating in Mexico to comply with the stipulations of the NAFTA 
environmental side accord for reporting to a PRTR similar to those in the rest of North 
America (Nauman 2004).  
 
This has inspired efforts to create a mandatory public register in Chile and NGOs in 
Costa Rica have been mobilising around the same issue. The campaign has taken 10 
years to reach this far, however, with industry claiming compliance will be too 
cumbersome and costly and raising concerns about being forced to reveal trade secrets. 
Frequent turnover of staff within the Mexican government has also slowed the change 
process, amid changing bureaucratic roles, new battles over funding and having to 
build PRTR (Pollution and Release Transfer Register) staff capacity each time. 
Learning the lesson from this campaign, groups mobilising around ALCA have been 
calling for strict information disclosure requirements. The Sierra Club, for example, 
has argued under its ‘Fair trade bill of rights’ that companies should be required to 
disclose information on their toxic releases when they operate abroad on the basis that 
communities everywhere have a basic right to know (Sierra Club 2001). 
 
The extent to which groups mobilise around trade agreements, based on the Latin 
American experience, seems to reflect not only the formal political and institutional 
opportunity structures, as I discuss below, but also their sense of where their 
campaigning energies are most likely to yield change. The lack of spaces for 
engagement with Mercosur and the deliberate undermining of its environmental 
provisions has led some groups to abandon it and focus their attentions on ALCA, 
which is in any case potentially much more far-reaching in economic and 
environmental impact. This ‘strategic turn’ perhaps also reflects a broader power play 
in which the US is seeking to outmanoeuvre Mercosur by speeding up negotiations 
towards ALCA (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002). Aware of its importance, therefore, 
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Hochstetler (2003:4) suggests ‘South American environmentalists will join their 
Northern counterparts in opposition to the FTAA despite low levels of mobilisation 
around Mercosur’. She suggests;  
 
‘The member states of Mercosur are likely to get quite a bit more pressure from 
regional environmentalists about a potential FTAA than they have over Mercosur itself. 
Regional environmentalists have strong ties across the hemisphere on trade issues, ties 
that are often stronger than those among environmentalists in just the Mercosur 
countries. In addition, many of them have been willing to support Mercosur partly as a 
preferable outcome to the FTAA, but are wholly opposed to the latter’ (2003:26).8 
 
Outsiders 
 
Environmental NGOs critical of free trade have organised around each of the three key 
agreements discussed here. In Mexico, ENGOs actively opposed to the official NAFTA 
proposals were organised in the ‘Pact of Ecologists’. As in the U.S, the government 
made efforts to divide the coalition which succeeded in 1998 in pushing some moderate 
groups to break away, leaving the remaining groups to coalesce around a more critical 
agenda, acting mainly through RMALC.9 Though generally cast as an outsider group, 
RMLAC did also engage in formal exchanges with government on occasion, 
employing to some extent a ‘double-strategy’ (Hogenboom 1998:144).   
 
Opposition to ALCA within civil society has been widespread, reflecting both what is 
stake in political and economic terms and the number of countries and associated civil 
societies involved. A large number of anti-ALCA movements have developed positions 
that place themselves outside the process. The forms of protest in many ways mirror, 
and build on, experiences of campaigning around trade issues in the WTO and 
investment issues associated with the aborted MAI (Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment). ‘Virtual’ alliances held together through exchange of information and 
formulation of positions through exchange over the internet, combined with joint 
demonstrations around key summits such as Quito and Quebec, as well as the plurality 
of concerns hosted under ‘rainbow’ alliances, are indicative of this form of mobilising. 
Such protests have been aimed at challenging the secrecy of the process, as well as the 
nature of the development model being promoted. For example, one item of graffiti in 
Palermo, Buenos Aires from the time of the ALCA meeting there in 2001 reads ‘Su 
opulencia es nuestra exclusión’. 
 
Within these coalitions, environmental groups critical of the process and sceptical 
about the compatibility of trade liberalisation with sustainable development have 
articulated concerns which resonate with a much broader critique of neo-liberal 
development models. There are the familiar concerns about both the environmental 
impact of increased volumes of trade and the potential for mobile capital to exploit 
lower environmental standards, as it is claimed has occurred in the maquiladoras, or to 
encourage ‘regulatory chill’ among states competing for their investment. As one group 
argues, ‘ALCA implies a direct increase in the consumption and therefore production 
                                                          
8  See for example, ‘Sustainable South’ and ‘Sustainable Southern Cone’. 
9   This coalition included alongside environmental groups, worker and peasant groups, 
development and human rights groups and women’s groups. It was created in 1991 in the 
context of the NAFTA negotiations.  
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of fossil fuels, this implies an increase in CO2 emissions which the US does not want to 
control’ (Acción Ecológica 2004 [my translation]). Relatedly, by reforming the legal 
base of energy policy in the region, there is concern that exploration for and extraction 
of fossil fuels will increase, further implying both social impacts on those that inhabit 
these areas (often poorer indigenous communities) and of course environmental 
damage in forested and fragile ecosystems (Acción Ecológica 2004).  
 
On the question of rules, the issue is the compatibility of trade and environmental rules. 
The title of a Sierra Club briefing on ALCA captures this position; ‘New pro-corporate 
rules threaten our environment and health’ (u.d). These strategies and positions are very 
much cast by the NAFTA debate and the need to build on the lessons from that 
experience. A key set of concerns, raised both during NAFTA talks and subsequently, 
centre on the issue of the likelihood that trade rules will be allowed to over-ride 
environmental provisions, over-turning regulations hard won at national level. This 
resonates with claims environmentalists have made internationally that there is an 
imbalance between regulation for business over regulation of business (Newell 2001). 
In the NAFTA context the right of multinational companies to sue is one manifestation 
of this, where in the Ethyl case, for example, the Canadian company Methanex 
successfully sued the US for $1 billion after California phased out a hazardous gasoline 
additive which the company helped to manufacture. Sierra Club (u.d) claim ‘Under the 
FTAA, as under NAFTA, individual foreign investors could gain the right to sue the 
United States for cash damages before secretive, three judge panels’ should 
environmental laws affect their profits under broad interpretations of 
non-discrimination provisions. ALCA, like NAFTA, also proposes to ban the use of 
‘performance requirements’ which environmentalists see as key to sustainable 
production (Newell 2004). Previous cases of trade-environment conflicts that have 
gone before the WTO dispute panel involving Latin American countries, do not give 
environmentalists many grounds for optimism that environmental measures will not be 
overridden by trade concerns.10 
 
Beyond challenging specific provisions of the trade agreements, some groups have 
sought to change the rules of engagement, rather than make use of those that exist as 
insider groups have. In the context of NAFTA, the strategy of the adversarial coalition 
was to try and change the rules of the negotiations through, for example, House 
resolutions (246) and a NEPA lawsuit. As noted, they also formed alliances with other 
oppositional elements, most notably from the labour movement. For example, the 
MODTLE (Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor and the Environment) was 
established as a tri-national dialogue among activists from all three NAFTA countries. 
                                                          
10   Perhaps the most high-profile of the cases involving trade rules and environmental 
protection measures was that involving the U.S and Mexico in a dispute over restrictions on the 
import of Mexican tuna on the grounds that it was caught with nets that were trapping dolphins. 
The decision, made in 1991, was that the restriction of trade for protection of the environment 
outside a country’s border contravened GATT rules and that production process standards are 
considered to be non-tariff barriers. U.S environmentalist Ralph Nader described the decision 
as a ‘breathtaking attack on progress made in the last ten years’ (quoted in Vogel 1997:114). A 
second case concerned a challenge by Venezuela and Brazil in 1996 to the implementation of 
the U.S Clean Air Act of 1990 which, they argued, discriminated against foreign refineries. The 
Dispute Panel ruled in favour of Venezuela and Mexico and the Appellate body confirmed this 
ruling. The decision served to entrench the view of environmentalists that the dispute 
settlement procedures in the world trading system were biased against environmental interests. 
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Via Campesina? 
 
For a set of reasons already alluded to, campesino and indigenous peoples’ groups have 
become increasingly involved in regional debates about trade policy. Their strong ties 
to agriculture, proximity to resource rich areas and dependence on resource economies, 
as well as their sensitivity to issues of property rights and access to affordable services, 
mean that trade agendas that have broadened to cover these issues necessarily impact 
upon their livelihoods. As organisations of the poor, such groups have nothing like the 
political clout or resources of some of their counterparts in the labour and 
environmental movement, but they have sought to make their voices heard through 
traditional patterns of protest, resistance and confrontation with the state. 
 
Philip Oxhorn claims ‘In many ways, indigenous movements present the most 
fundamental challenges for understanding the quality of democratic regimes and for 
theories of social movements. Their distinctly non-western experience, history of 
violent abuse, and understanding of rights in collective rather than liberal-individualist 
terms all seem to set them apart from other movements, and perhaps even from the 
context of civil society in which they are frequently placed’ (2001:174). Inspite of this, 
or perhaps because of it, Korovkin (2001:37) notes an ‘urban bias’ in much of the 
literature on social movements in Latin America, such that most studies ‘barely touch 
on organisational processes in rural areas, especially those populated by indigenous 
peoples.’ This is significant from the point of view of participation in trade policy, 
which tends to be centred in around capital cities and involving trade policy activists 
whose links to rural or grassroots groups are often weak. 
 
Within the last few decades have seen a resurgence in campesino movements and 
movements of rural workers, more autonomous than before and more independent of 
the state and political parties (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002:193; Polanco 1997; Edelman 
1999). In Brazil this has taken the form of the movement of the landless (MST 
Movimiento de los Trabajadores Sin Tierra) known for its land occupations, though 
similar demands for access to land have driven movements in Mexico, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Paraguay. Again, such movements appear to be 
most active in areas with high concentrations of indigenous populations. Examples 
include La Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), 
the movement Katarista de Bolivia the Consejo Regional Indígena del CAUCA 
(Colombia), Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero (MOCASE Argentina) 
União das Nações Indígenas (Brazil) and the EZLN (Zapitistas) organised under a 
politico-ethnic banner. Few have been able to emulate the success or profile of the MST 
on these issues alone,11  though in global terms the EZLN perhaps attracts more 
attention.  
 
In other contexts (Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala) movements have 
taken the form of armed struggles. In some settings movements identify themselves by 
their indigenous, ethnic or community identities. In some cases they have formed 
                                                          
11  The MST’s success is partly related to the fact that a large part of the population is 
sympathetic to the struggle for agrarian reform and agrees that the government should 
confiscate unproductive land and redistribute it to those without land (Teubal and Rodriguez 
2002:195). 
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alliances with women’s and environmental movements, in the latter case against large 
projects such as hydroelectric dams. In general they represent and campaign on issues 
that affect those most exploited in the countryside, though occasionally they work with 
producer groups such as the Movimiento de Mujeres Agropecuarias en Lucha (MMAL) 
de la Argentina (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002:193). Often broader critiques are 
explicitly articulated, such as in the case of the Zapatistas who are expressly critical of 
NAFTA. Indeed, the Zapatista movement is in many ways a product of the impact of 
neo-liberal reforms on the rural poor in Mexico which turned the rural poor against the 
governing PRI whom they had traditionally supported and towards the platform 
articulated by EZLN (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002; Acción Ecológica 2004). While the 
struggles of such groups are essentially based around land claims and for better living 
conditions, they articulate, according to Teubal and Rodriguez, ‘more important social 
currents against the contemporary global model of neo-liberalism’ (2002: 195 [my 
translation]). For example, CONAIE participated in, and often led, protests and strikes 
against structural adjustment in Ecuador in the mid-1990s (Korovkin 2001). 
 
This then is the entry point to understanding the role of campesino and indigenous 
peoples’ movements in regional trade debates. Clearly opposed to many of the central 
tenets of the liberalisation process, such movements are outsiders in the process, though 
clearly can lay claim to a much broader constituency of support and interest than most 
environmental groups. While ALCA is seen by some as an opportunity for social 
groups to put forward proposals that they have developed in the context of Mercosur on 
social and campesino issues (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002), others raise concerns about 
specific provisions of the proposed ALCA that have specific implications for 
campesinos and indigenous peoples. Issues of particular concern include agricultural 
reforms and the removal of subsidies, fears about further consolidation of power in the 
hands of large food producers and measures to strengthen IPR protection, in particular 
the ability to register private property claims over communally held resources in the 
manner permitted by the WTO TRIPs accord) (Acción Ecológica 2004).  
 
Reflecting a broader Via Campesina agenda of food sovereignty (la soberania 
alimentaria), such groups express resistance to entrenching the external food 
dependency that already characterises many of the countries in the region, as well as 
displacing existing production and rural livelihoods with the expansion of North 
American agriculture in the region (Teubal and Rodriguez 2002:188). Their fears are 
fanned by the experience of the rural poor in Mexico in the wake of NAFTA where, for 
example, the maize sector lost a considerable degree of competitiveness, especially in 
the ejidal sector (communal) where there are fewer opportunities to diversify produce 
or modernise traditional patterns of cultivation in order to compete in the open market 
(ibid: 189). It was these negative impacts, according to Teubal and Rodriguez, that 
fuelled the rural protests in Mexico and offer a sign of the possible impacts of ALCA on 
the same sectors in the rest of Latin America and therefore of which groups may 
mobilise around the agreement (2002:189).  
 
Less focussed explicitly on agriculture, these groups have also opposed, alongside 
others, the privatisation of key public services which raise questions of employment, 
access and affordability for their members. For example, campesino and indigenous 
groups were active in the battle at Conchabamba Bolivia over increased prices which 
put access to water beyond the reach of these groups, as it did in Guayaquil in Ecuador 
when a foreign company assumed control of its supply (Acción Ecológica 2004).  
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Global connections in their campaigning become apparent in so far as opposition to 
ALCA is re-framed as a broader struggle against the global industrialisation and 
intensification of agriculture, or the privatisation of public services the world over. 
Connections have been forged, for example, to international campaigns against GMOs, 
which also have a regional resonance given the centrality of Argentina12 and Brazil to 
the global GM debate. According to Teubal and Rodriguez, ‘Various campesino 
movements have successfully articulated in recent years an authentic global 
movement’ (2002:197 [my translation]). This is grounded in opposition to TNC control 
of agriculture (including patenting and bio-piracy), free trade in agricultural produce 
(especially dumping), the use of hormones and transgenics and in favour, amongst 
other things, of food security and food sovereignty. Again, the umbrella group Via 
Campesina would perhaps provide the clearest articulation of this position and 
demonstrates its global connectivity through involvement in the World Social Forums, 
for example. Coalition-building of this sort and a range of protest activities have been 
the main strategies adopted by campesino movements, often aided as noted above by 
the financial support of sympathetic groups in Europe and North America. 
 
The positions, strategies and patterns of influence associated with campesino and 
indigenous peoples’ groups stand in sharp contrast to other voices from the rural actor; 
organised agricultural associations and farmers’ unions with greater resources and 
many more openings to engage with the formal process of trade policy. The power of 
the large agricultural lobbies in North America and their ability to extract subsidies and 
concessions is notorious. But campesino movements should also be counter-posed with 
large farming unions and associations that represent the views of landed agricultural 
elites in Latin America, not only in terms of their membership base, but in terms of their 
ability to engage effectively with regional trade debates. In Argentina groups such as 
Sociedad Rural Argentina and la Cámara de Exportadores have offices employing 
professionals with the mandate and resources to conduct strategic analysis of the 
implications of trade negotiations such as ALCA (Walsh et al 2003:41). They also have 
sufficient media and political connections to guarantee exposure of their positions and 
sympathy for their demands.13 
 
Insider/Outsider Influence 
 
These differences in approach between insiders and outsiders indicate not only diverse 
strategic preferences, but also significant ideological differences, that successive trade 
negotiations have merely served to entrench. This difference in approach reflects a 
broader split within the environmental movement, in particular, between those who 
view trade liberalisation per se as antithetical to ecological sustainability and those who 
take the view that under certain conditions trade liberalisation can contribute to 
sustainability. Just as Unions adopted very different positions on NAFTA depending on 
whether they were a social movement or a business union, so the environmental 
community has mobilised around different issues and priorities accordingly. Reflecting 
these differences, groups such as the National Wildlife Federation, NRDC, the 
                                                          
12  Foro de la Tierra y la Alimentación 
13  For example, in Argentina, the day after speeches by leaders of the Sociedad Rural 
and government ministers at the annual Feria Rural, conservative papers such as La 
Nacion routinely devote front-page coverage to their demands and proposals.  
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Environmental Defense Fund and World Wildlife Fund were able to support NAFTA14, 
while the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Public Citizen, for 
example, took an adversarial position (Obach 2004). The former constructed the 
‘Environmental Coalition for NAFTA’ which sought to have the accord, complete with 
side agreement, accepted. Audley notes (1997:91) ‘What had begun in January 1991 as 
a unified effort to include environmental issues into trade policy ended in bitter 
disagreement among those organisations most actively involved in negotiations’.15 Ties 
between critics and the pro-NAFTA alliance were nevertheless maintained by groups 
such as Sierra Club and Public Citizen (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003), again 
suggesting the permeability of categories of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. 
 
These divisions made it easier for administrations like the US to minimise the conflict 
caused by environmental issues by targeting key environmental groups willing to 
accommodate President Bush’s economic objectives (Audley 1997:59). Endorsement 
of NAFTA by the majority of national environmental organisations ‘neutralized’ any 
threat posed by environmental opponents to the agreement because such endorsement 
gave the administration, members of Congress and other pro-trade policy elites solid 
support for their defence of NAFTA on environmental grounds (Audley 1997:109). 
The deal was reciprocated. Audley notes, (1997:130) ‘organizations supporting 
NAFTA were rewarded with a higher number of advisory appointments, thereby 
facilitating long-term participation in trade policy monopolies.’ During key debates on 
fast track decision-making on trade, for example, accommodating groups moderated 
their demands in exchange for formalized roles in trade policy. Representatives of a 
few environmental organisations were invited to join policy advisory committees of 
USTR, for example (Hogenboom 1998:161). Those invited were those that had shifted 
position to support the trade initiative including NRDC, WWF, NWF Nature 
Conservancy and National Auduborn Society. 
 
In return for access, accommodating groups found it increasingly necessary to distance 
themselves from groups such as Greenpeace and Public Citizen. Indeed, ‘Preferred 
access to pro-trade policy elites and willingness to avoid public conflicts between trade 
officials and their own organisations positioned accommodating groups to exert greater 
influence over the tone and content of the environmental demands for NAFTA than was 
enjoyed by adversarial organisations’ (Audley 1997:84). Part of this strategy involved 
not fielding politically unrealistic policy alternatives and being willing to offer 
recommendations open to broad interpretation, aimed at keeping the environmental 
community ‘within political reach of accepting the policy alternatives negotiated in 
NAFTA’ (Audley 1997:87). As a result of interviews with congressional staff, 
negotiators and administrative officials, Audley (1997:90) deduces that WWF and 
EDF, in particular, were instrumental in creating the NAFTA provisions. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, these groups also have the strongest ties to Republican party elites. 
Mayer (2002:102-103) also suggests that although many changes requested by the 
environmental community were not adopted, the language on environmental, health 
and safety standards was ‘renegotiated.’ The trade-off of dropping opposition in favour 
                                                          
14  At one point in support of a strong and independent commission, these groups 
formed part of a self-styled group of 7 (WWF, NRDC, EDF, NWF, NAS, Defenders of 
Wildlife and the Nature Conservancy) (Mayer 2002:106).  
15  There were also of course important differences of opinion within organisations and 
between group’s and their boards that had to be overcome (Audley 1997). 
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of participation did not perhaps yield the results the groups expected. Audley concludes 
overall; ‘environmental groups traded the preemptive leverage they once enjoyed 
during the trade negotiations for procedural inclusion in trade policy decisions but did 
not realise the potential leverage enjoyed by older members of the trade policy regime’ 
(Audley 1997:137). 
 
Though bringing different benefits to the groups concerned, the strategies groups 
adopted may have had the effect of reinforcing oneanother. Audley’s (1995) study of 
the environmental movement’s role in the NAFTA debate suggests that 
accommodating and adversarial strategies were key to the participation of 
environmental groups in the trade talks. The combination of ‘good cop/bad cop 
positions’, meant that engagement with those groups pushing a more accommodating 
agenda was made more attractive by the vocal pressure and opposition of more 
confrontational elements within the movement. Responding to their moderated 
demands was necessary because the adversarial environmental coalition maintained a 
plausible threat to defeat NAFTA (Audley 1997: 149). Further, ‘Organizations 
responsible for establishing and maintaining that threat were incapable of using the 
leverage to change the agenda but were essential in creating the space for cooperative 
environmental organisations to translate pre-emptive power into concessions’ (Audley 
1997:152). 
 
Despite criticism of the accommodating strategy of insider groups, Audley (1997:152) 
maintains it may have been the ability of these groups ‘to establish a set of conditions 
within reach of the U.S negotiators and neutralize the opposition voice from within the 
environmental community, that gained environmental organizations the concessions 
now embodied in NAFTA’. One factor that enabled them to do this was the small 
number of environmental groups actively involved in the decision-making. This 
reflected a general lack of priority attached to trade issues among leading 
environmental groups. Among the national environmental organisations involved in 
NAFTA from the U.S, there were fewer than six staff people dedicated to trade and 
environment issues (Audley 1997:73). Their control of the agenda may be further 
consolidated by the additional resourcing they have been able to attract to work on trade 
and environment issues from philanthropic foundations as a result of their more 
accommodating positions. 
 
Their engagement (and effectiveness) was, at the same, heavily shaped by the tactics 
and policy agendas of policy-makers they were seeking to influence. Particularly 
important here were the formal and informal rules and relationships adopted by trade 
policy elites to minimize the impact of environmental interests on negotiations (Audley 
1997:64). For example, President Bush selected representatives from five national 
environmental organisations and one-state level environmental director to participate 
as members of the USTR’s public advisory committee. As with the scenario described 
previously, the selection of these advisors from environmental groups involved in trade 
negotiations revealed ‘an effort to incorporate environmental groups most likely not to 
oppose negotiations’ (Audley 1997:65). Audley argues; ‘Careful selection and 
placement of environmental advisors and control over the manner in which 
environmental issues were framed within trade policy negotiations enabled the Bush 
administration to minimize the influence of formally incorporating environmental 
issues into negotiations’ (Audley 1997:68). 
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5. Institutionalised participation and political opportunity structures  
 
I noted in section 2 the importance attached to political opportunity structures in 
shaping the ways in which the movements seek influence and the extent to which 
channels exist for them to make their voices heard. The challenge of constructing the 
institutional means for organised civil society to make a contribution to trade debates is 
certainly not unique to Latin America, as I noted in the introduction. It has also long 
been acknowledged by international environmental bodies. The Commission on 
Sustainable Development, in a general review of relationships between trade, 
environment and development, found that ‘there is considerable need for improvement 
in areas of transparency, openness and the active involvement of the public and experts 
in relation to its work on trade and environment’ (CSD 1995).  
 
The purpose of this section is to look at those mechanisms of participation that exist 
within the formal arenas created by NAFTA, Mercosur and ALCA respectively, with a 
view to understanding for whom such processes are working and which groups and 
interests are effectively screened out of current regional trade debates by the ways these 
institutional channels have been constructed. In sum, which mechanisms exist, who is 
able to use these spaces effectively and under what conditions? 
 
NAFTA 
 
With NAFTA, we see clearly how institutional and historical factors interact to create 
opportunities and challenges for groups seeking to shape trade policy. Audley 
(1997:48) notes, ‘The combination of institutional factors-historical circumstances, 
procedural rules and presidential politics -created a situation ripe for an interest group 
not formally part of the trade regime to gain access by acting as a pivotal player in 
establishing a compromise that enabled pro-trade elites to pursue their agenda of trade 
liberalisation’. I noted above how environmental organisations exploited this 
opportunity to formalise their participation in negotiations by benefiting, however 
unconsciously, from the strong differences of opinion over the merits of trade. This 
suggests the importance, not just of political windows of opportunity to push for 
change, but also the importance of issue-framing and discourse, either as a strategy to 
emphasise unity and diversity, as used by some of the alliances against free trade, or as 
a mechanism of exclusion and de-legitimation, as it is often used by policy elites. I 
noted in section 2 the bounded nature of much of the discourse and the knowledge 
forms which underpin it in relation to the construction of liberalised trade as a panacea 
for tackling poverty and achieving sustainable development. Audley notes in the 
NAFTA context, ‘Confining the scope of NAFTA’s negotiations to exclude 
fundamental issues of concern to environmentalists produced a situation in which 
dialogue surrounding these issues is now dominated by the scope and normative 
principles of free trade’ (Audley 1997:138). 
 
As I noted in the introduction, the impact of campaigns on institutional structures is 
often not easy to discern in the short term, but may yield longer term benefits for groups 
in the future. Hence with NAFTA, although environmental concerns over trade policy 
did not ‘substantively alter the norms and principles of trade policy’ (Audley 1997:4), 
some (minor) changes to institutional procedures were achieved that may create 
windows of opportunity for future activism around NAFTA. Audley notes (1997: 118), 
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‘While NAFTA did not alter the practice of using trade experts as panelists, panel 
members may now call upon experts from the environmental community to provide 
them information relevant to the case’. A Border Environmental Cooperation 
Commission was also created in response to concerns expressed by NGOs about the 
effect of trade expansion on the Mexico-U.S border. An eighteen member Advisory 
Board, made up of residents of the border region, is integrated into the decision-making 
procedure to ensure that interests of state and local communities affected by BECC 
decisions are represented (Audley 1997:122).  
 
The Montreal-based trinational North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC), set up by the NAFTA environmental side agreement, has also been 
useful to the environmental right-to-know movement, described above. It has 
established a multi-stakeholder PRTR advisory council ‘that forments cross-border 
efforts to strengthen environmental RTK’ (Nauman 2004). Both UNITAR (UN 
Institute for Training and Research) and CEC have leant support to carry out work 
related to this function. UNITAR funded a multi-sector National Coordinating Group 
to initiate discussions on this issue and limited support has been forthcoming from CEC 
for developing a web site, holding conferences and workshops, providing training to 
corporate executives and promoting public outreach. Nevertheless, national level 
commitment to the process has been lacking on occasion. The Mexican PRTR advisory 
committee on the regulations ‘was heavily weighted with industry opponents, federal 
funding for travel to meetings has been non-existent and meeting announcements often 
were made at the last minute. All this has made participation difficult’ (Nauman 2004). 
Indicative of the trend towards industry domination of the process, the National 
Coordinating Group set up by the PRTR to oversee policy formulation consisted of 38 
groups, only four of which were NGOs and academics. In addition, results of the 
reporting from the first cycle will not be made public because Mexican legislation does 
not require it and resources do not exist to go beyond requirements.  
 
The environmental side agreement of NAFTA also creates a Joint Public Advisory 
Committee (JPAC) to the NACEC designed to provide input from NGOs and the 
private sector to the NACEC’s governing council (Fisher 2002). The Joint Public 
Advisory Committee consists of 15 members, with each nation appointing an equal 
number of representatives. The committee seeks public input and recommendations to 
help determine the advice it provides to the Environmental Council (Blum 2000). 
According to Fisher (2002:189), ‘By consistently working to seek public input and 
incorporate the insights and expertise of civil society into its activities and projects, the 
NACEC’s initiatives have been greatly enhanced’. Articles 14 and 15 of the side 
agreement provide that any citizen or NGO from the parties may send to the secretariat 
a submission asserting that a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law 
in order to promote exports or investment. In response, the NACEC’s secretariat may 
be obliged to provide a factual record, though without legal value or the ability to 
trigger trade sanctions. 
 
Despite these institutional innovations and the degree of interest the agreement 
generated, and continues to generate, NAFTA has been criticised for its top-down 
approach and lack of consultation with civil society in the negotiation process (Deere 
and Esty 2002). A key lesson from this experience has been that merely having the 
mechanisms in place does not mean they are used effectively. As of the end of August 
2001 the NACEC had received just 31 citizen submissions, 12 of which were under 
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review and 19 had been closed. 10 of the 19 closed submissions were terminated 
because they did not meet the established criteria (Gitli and Murillo 2002). 
 
Resources, perceptions of return on effort and shifts in strategic priorities mean that the 
extent to which groups make use of or engage these mechanisms will change over time. 
For example, since the heyday of NAFTA, leading environmental groups such as the 
Sierra Club have shifted their focus away from daily participation in the activities of 
trade bodies and sought to focus their attention instead on raising the level of interest in 
trade policy among their members (Audley 1997:133). Lack of resources, even among 
the accommodating groups, inhibits further participation. Audley (1997:133) suggests, 
‘Even among the organisations that were appointed to the most number of advisory 
boards, there is little money to maintain the same level of participation in trade and 
environment debates’. Costly engagement is more difficult to justify in a context of 
pervading frustration with lack of leverage in the process. The concern about lack of 
progress is compounded by a number of factors. First, the proliferation in the number of 
forum where dialogue takes place, each requiring time, personnel and money. ‘None of 
the organizations has the resources to sustain such a high level of commitment. The 
large number of forums also serves to dissipate focused interest in the dialogue itself’ 
(Audley 1997:133). And despite efforts by NGOs themselves to continue the dialogue 
informally, there remains a strong sense in which ‘the political opportunity to continue 
pressing for trade policy reform has passed’ (Audley 1997:133). 
 
Mercosur 
 
In comparison with NAFTA, Mercosur’s mechanisms of participation are 
under-developed. While ambitious in its economic and commercial dimensions, 
Mercosur is weak in the construction of political dimensions that facilitate participation 
and representation of citizens that make up its member states (Scagliola 2002:157). The 
Agreement of Florianopolis, the Environmental Framework Agreement in Mercosur, 
spells out in two places the importance members attach to civil society participation ‘in 
the treatment of environmental questions’ and more generally ‘in the protection of the 
environment and the use of sustainable natural resources’ (Decision No. 2/01-Annex; 
preamble and chapter 1(e)). 
 
There is a Foro Consultivo Económico y Social, created by the Protocol of Ouro Preto 
in 1994, which has spaces designed for businesses and unions, but offers few 
opportunities for environmental or other activists (Botto and Tussie 2003:32). Indeed, 
business groups actively sought to exclude other social groups from this consultative 
forum. This privileging of business and labour actors over environment, human rights, 
peasant and womens’ organisations is part of a regional trend in South America, 
according to Gudynas (2001). In the case of both the Foro and the Comisión, described 
below, Hochstetler concludes (2003b:212 [my translation]) they ‘only have 
consultative functions that make them cul de sacs for political participation’. Hence, 
while some herald the emergence of a ‘regional democratic public space’, Carranza 
suggests that voice within Mercosur’s institutional structure, even for labour ‘centrals’, 
has not translated into effective participation in the definition of social and labour 
policies (2003:93) 
  
As with other regional integration processes, those standing to benefit from expanded 
market opportunities under the Mercosur agreement, have been heavily involved from 
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the outset (cf Grant et al 2000). Privileged industry access is often justified by the 
shared rationale of market integration and the practical and experiential expertise 
industry groups can claim to have (Hochstetler 2003a). The plans for Mercosur, 
according to Teubal and Rodriguez, ‘were made with privileged participation of the big 
economic groups and governments leaving to one side small industry, small producers 
and workers’ (2002:185 [my translation]). The details of the decisions made at 
meetings of SGT6 are quite explicit about the key role of business, while civil society 
groups hardly get a mention (Secretaria do Meio Ambiente Governo do Estado de São 
Paulo 1997). Business groups from Brazil and Argentina were among those that have 
participated most extensively. This general pattern of influence is also true of ALCA 
where El Foro Empresario de las Américas and La Red Empresaria para la 
Integración Hemisférica have gained recognition by governments, as well as extensive 
access to them in order to present their proposals (Casaburi and Zalazar 2001).  
 
Whilst acknowledging these privileged inputs into the policy process, it is important to 
emphasise that control of decision-making has rested with national governments within 
Mercosur. The majority of decisions regarding Mercosur are taken by national 
Presidents and their economic and diplomatic advisers with little input from citizens 
(Hochstetler 2003a:210). The process has been led by national ministers and ministries 
of foreign affairs and economy through bodies such as the Mercosur Consejo del 
Mercado Común. Primary responsibility for implementation is given to the Grupo del 
Mercado Común, made up of representatives from the national economic and foreign 
ministries and central banks. Unlike NAFTA, the dispute resolution mechanisms 
within Mercosur, which in theory could provide an opening for citizen engagement, are 
under-developed and specifically, there are no environmental dispute resolution 
mechanisms and there is no mention of the role of citizen groups. As Hochstetler 
(2003:13) puts it; ‘in practice, most conflicts are resolved through direct negotiations 
among the region’s national presidents, a forum not especially open to broad social 
participation’. Even the joint parliament (Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta) is simply 
made up of selected members of the four national congresses and, while in theory this 
provides more opportunities for engagement by civil society actors, it is structurally 
very weak and therefore plays a limited role in key decision-making.  
 
NGOs often have fewer established ties and points of access to those ministries leading 
the Mercosur negotiations. Hochstetler (2003:12) notes; ‘Both by design and by the 
political development of Mercosur over time, the foreign and economic ministries 
dominate the Mercosur process and they have regularly focussed on other issues’. This 
reflects a broader trend within trade policy-making where ministries with the weakest 
ties to environmental groups have the strongest influence over the direction of policy. 
As Alanis-Ortega and Gonzalez-Lutzenkirchen (2002:44) note; ‘Within Mexico, the 
Economic Ministry exerts extensive influence on environmental policy 
decision-making, regulations and practices that could influence economic or trade 
activity. At the international level, Mexico’s Economic Ministry actively negotiates for 
Mexico in multilateral environmental forums where trade questions arise.’ In this 
sense, officials from these ministries get to exercise a veto over environmental policy 
measures with which they disagree. This is part of a broader regional trend where, with 
increasing attention to the potential of regional trade for fuelling national growth, 
economic technocrats working for these ministries have assumed a privileged role in 
national policy-making (Hogenboom 1998). 
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The profile of these actors is in strong contrast to the weakness of environmental actors, 
governmental and non-governmental. In some cases, even assuming that 
environmentalists have good relations with environmental ministries, is problematic. 
There are examples of environmental policy leaders actively intervening to block 
reform agendas pursued by environmentalists. Hochstetler cites the example of 
President Menem of Argentina’s environmental secretary, Maria Julia Alsogaray, who 
‘made no secret of her views that any environmental protections needed to be kept 
profoundly coherent with the demands of neo-liberalism’ (2003:10). 
 
The regional environmental institutions of Mercosur that do exist, are essentially a 
gathering of the four national environmental agencies (Hochstetler 2003:5). The 
working subcommittees of Mercosur have no permanent agenda or roles, except in the 
most general sense to enable the realisation of the goals of the Treaty of Asunción, 
leaving them little capacity to act as autonomous policy entrepreneurs. As Hochstetler 
(2003:13) notes ‘These provisions give the Ministries of Foreign Relations and 
Economy considerable control over SGT6…which they have not hesitated to exercise, 
often endorsing other goals over environmental protection’. Weak institutions in this 
regard equate with fewer channels of access or mechanisms of influence, however 
indirect, regarding key power brokers within the foreign and trade ministries. It is clear 
then, that the majority of opportunities that environmental activists could make use of 
within the Mercosur decision-making structure are confined to environmental areas 
that are considered secondary problems by the key Mercosur bodies. Hochstetler 
(2003:15) notes, ‘Given the limited agenda and powers of the Environmental 
Sub-committee, it is not surprising that SGT6 has not become a major focus for 
environmentalists in the region, even though it has tried to include non-governmental 
actors.’16 The marginalisation of environmental concerns within Mercosur in general, 
compounds and even encourages their own (self) exclusion from the centres of 
decision-making. 
 
Those openings for civil society participation that do exist are certainly not open to all 
groups and perspectives in the same way. Consistent with the pattern described above, 
SGT6 has been especially keen to involve industrial interests. From its fourth meeting 
in 1996, SGT6 invited the private sector to participate in the opening day of its 
meetings, though non-state actors were excluded from later decision-making sessions. 
SGT6 documents make clear the bodies preference for bringing in groups that ‘have 
some direct interest in any of the stages of the process of production, distribution and 
consumption’ (Hochstetler 2003:15). Interestingly, this definition has been used to 
include environmentalists, even if it is clearly not a proactive call for their participation 
(Hochstetler 2003:15). In contrast, private sector actors can ask to be put on the first 
day agenda and to make their own proposals directly. These formal inputs into the 
regional process are of course complemented by openings provided by national 
governments. During the NAFTA negotiations in Mexico, for example, the ‘cuarto de 
junto’ (side-room) negotiations allowed top business leaders to work out strategies and 
positions with top officials from the Salinas government (Alanis-Ortega and 
González-Lutzenkirchen 2002:46).  
 
Pre-negotiation meetings with national delegations provide a potentially important 
                                                          
16  The ECOS Foundation has been the only regional environmental NGO specifically 
created to track the Mercosur process. 
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avenue of influence for civil society actors. Both Argentina and Brazil hold national 
meetings before Mercosur meetings to discuss the agenda. Hochstetler (2003:15) 
suggests in the past, government representatives from Argentina have presented written 
proposals and documents from national NGOs networks in closed sessions. 
Government representatives from SGT6 have also participated in NGO-led dialogues 
with government such as that organised by the group ECOS in 1998 on ‘External trade, 
the environment and sustainable development within Mercosur: The role of civil 
society’ (Hochstetler 2003a:213). 
 
Such informal engagements do not compensate for the many restrictions on meaningful 
NGO participation in Mercosur proceedings. There are difficulties in accessing 
information about decisions in the process of being made, or even that have already 
been made within Mercosur (CEDA 2002). Documents are not routinely distributed in 
advance so, as Hochstetler (2003:15) suggests, ‘meetings can consist of observers 
sitting at the margins of a room while SGT6 members sit at a central table and make 
cryptic comments about negotiating documents, without divulging their actual 
content’. Another mechanism which permits decision-makers within Mercosur to deny 
NGO access to their meetings is to call ‘extraordinary’ rather than ‘ordinary’ meetings 
which means that NGOs cannot even attend the first day of the meeting.  
 
There is also evidence that levels of participation have actually decreased over time 
(Hochstetler 2003), perhaps reflecting the dynamic, already noted, whereby some 
NGOs choose to disengage from a process that offers few returns, especially after the 
diluting of the protocol on environmental issues and the continued narrow pro-trade 
bias of SGT6. Though previously it was the case that the greatest presence from 
environmental groups would be from the country where the meeting was being hosted, 
by the time of the Mercosur meeting in December 2001, no environmentalists attended. 
In addition to what has already been said, this also underscores the importance of cost 
as a barrier to participation, even in regional trade meetings, as well as lack of 
awareness that the meetings were actually taking place. The importance of funding to 
enable participation from civil society has been underscored by NGO calls for 
financing mechanisms to cover the costs of groups wanting to attend the meetings of 
environment ministers (CEDA 2002). 
 
ALCA 
 
 
“Despite repeated calls for the open and democratic development of trade policy, the 
FTAA negotiations have been conducted without citizen input. A process has been set 
up to solicit citizens’ views, but there is no real mechanism to incorporate the publics’ 
concerns into the actual negotiations. The public has been given nothing more than a 
suggestion box. At the same time, however, hundreds of corporate representatives are 
advising the US negotiators and have advance access to the negotiating texts. While 
citizens are left in the dark, corporations are helping to write the rules for the FTAA’’. 
 
Global Exchange (ud) 
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Perhaps in contrast to Mercosur, the involvement of diverse social actors has been on 
the agenda of ALCA from the very beginning (Botto 2003). From Quebec onwards, the 
summits of the Americas have pronounced the importance of civil society participation 
in ALCA deliberations. The Ministerial reunion in San José in 1998 produced a 
declaration to this effect. At the Santiago summit, governments confirmed that they 
encouraged ‘all sectors of civil society to participate and to contribute in a constructive 
manner their points of view through mechanisms of consultation and dialogue created 
in the process of the ALCA negotiations’ (Ricco 2004:7 [my translation]). Efforts to 
promote transparency, access to information through the internet (such as text being 
negotiated between states), public reports and participation in seminars, are held up as 
evidence of efforts to reach out to civil society (CEDA 2002), even if concerns remain 
about the technical nature of information provided which is difficult for citizens to 
make sense of (Ricco 2004).  
 
It is the establishment of a Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society 
that forms the centre piece of ALCA’s architecture of participation, however. The 
FTAA draft declares the objectives of the committee to be information exchange, 
establishing procedures for accepting submissions, issuing status reports on the 
negotiations and managing civil society inputs. It is dismissed by critics, meanwhile, as 
a ‘meaningless side show’. This is due to its absence of authority, work plan and lack of 
a real mandate, operating more as a ‘drop box’ for comments from civil society than a 
serious forum for debate (Deere and Esty 2002:7). According to ALCA’s own web site, 
‘Vice-Ministers and Ministers are to decide the treatment and response to be given to 
these contributions’ (ALCA 2004). Groups can submit recommendations to the 
committee, ‘but the committee is not obligated to actually consider the views 
expressed’ (Blum 2000:6). This lack of follow-up on the impact of proposals submitted 
has led to sharp criticism of its effectiveness as a mechanism of participation (Casaburi 
and Zalazar 2001).  
 
The underlying political purpose of the committee is made clear in the FTAA draft; 
‘The aim of the Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society is to build 
broad public understanding of and support for hemispheric trade liberalization by 
serving as a channel of communication between civil society at the regional level and 
the FTAA negotiations’ (cited in Blum 2000:6 [emphasis added]). It is also open only 
to those groups that express their views in a ‘constructive manner’ (ibid), a device 
clearly intended to screen out critics. The Mexican Commerce Minister (Herminio 
Blanco) stressed the limited role of the committee in the following terms; ‘This is no 
study group, no negotiating group, it’s a committee that receives proposals and presents 
them to ministers’ (Cited in Blum 2000:7). The short summaries produced by the 
committee of inputs from civil society for the Trade Negotiations Committee led 
environmentalists to react by saying; ‘We just don’t think it’s a good use of our 
time…We don’t want our view mediated by a bunch of bureaucrats’ (quoted in Blum 
2000:7). For all its limitations, the committee remains the only remaining official 
avenue for consideration of the environmental implications of the FTAA, given that the 
negotiating groups have failed to identify specific opportunities for raising 
environmental concerns directly (Caldwell 2002). Even the existing body has faced 
opposition from a number of Latin American countries (Fisher 2002). 
 
Since its creation, the CRG (The Committee of Government Representatives on Civil 
Society Participation) has met about 20 times and has extended three open invitations to 
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civil society groups to present contributions regarding the ALCA process (CIECA 
2002), the first of which was issued on 1st November 2001 (CEDA 2002). The first two 
calls received 70 contributions and the third received 56. Declining interest perhaps 
reflects both greater enthusiasm in response to the first call, the first such innovation of 
its sort, and subsequent frustration with the ‘drop-box’ model of participation (CIECA 
2002:337). In addition, five regional seminars about ALCA were organised (CIECA 
2002). Yet, according to Deere and Esty (2002:7), no formal process links the civil 
society dialogue and any of the FTAA’s nine negotiating groups. They suggest ‘In fact, 
no procedures even exist to guide the consideration of submissions from civil society, 
let alone analysis of them’. They claim there has been no substantive analysis of the 
more than 80 submissions received from various groups and organisations since the 
committee was established, only the brief summaries mentioned above. On this basis, 
they argue ‘Although the Civil Society Committee nominally reports directly to the 
FTAA trade ministers, it does so in terms that are far too general to be of any real use. 
Such lip service to critical issues and to the process of public participation promises to 
become a serious obstacle when it comes to ratify the FTAA’ (Deere and Esty 2002:7).  
 
As with Mercosur discussions, within ALCA, the false separation of arenas for the 
discussion of trade issues with the active involvement of business actors, and those 
where social and environmental issues were discussed and in which NGOs were 
present, led to many civil society groups withdrawing from the process (Botto and 
Tussie 2003:41). Without looking at the two sets of issues together, it would impossible 
to explore the effects of trade on poverty and the environment and entrenches a 
separation of trade objectives from broader development goals which many groups 
have been critical of (ONGs Chilenos 2003).  
 
There have been government led initiatives carried forward by individual 
administrations within the ALCA process to improve the participation of civil society 
in decision-making on environmental issues.17 Examples would include the initiative 
between the Bolivia government and the World Resources Institute, or the roles created 
by the governments of the US and Canada18 for processes led by groups such as 
Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, the North-South Centre of the University of Miami 
and latterly Corporación PARTICIPA and Fundación Esquel at key summits (Botto 
2003). Civil society groups have also created their own parallel conferences to register 
their views and make their voices heard, including on environmental issues. The 
‘Cumbre de los Pueblos’ that was set up alongside the Santiago meeting, for example, 
included a Foro de Medio Ambiente. Organisations such as Grupo de Apoyo a la 
Sociedad Civil also operated as a vehicle for coordinating the recommendations and 
evaluations of civil society groups during the summits (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003).  
 
In addition, while the focus of this section has been on the institutional opportunity 
structures available to civil society within regional trade accords, we should not 
                                                          
17  This is in addition to broader region wide initiatives through bodies such as the OEA 
such as its ‘Estrategia Interamericana para la Promoción de la Participación Pública en 
la Toma de Decisiones sobre Desarollo Sostenible’ or the same bodies initiation of the 
Foro Interamericano sobre Legislación Ambiental (Botto 2003:244). 
18  FOCAL (Fundación Canadiense para las Américas), an independent NGO, though 
financed by the Candian government, played a leadership role in facilitating civil 
society participation in the Quebec summit (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003).   
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overlook the importance of bilateral or sub-regional agreements such as CAFTA 
(Central America Free Trade Agreement). Bilateral trade accords provide a potentially 
important policy space for civil society participation. The Chile-Canada Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, negotiated in parallel to their bilateral free trade 
agreement, is held up as a positive model for handling environmental protection 
measures, but also contains a provision that allows citizens and NGOs of the two 
parties to make submissions alleging a party’s failure to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws. Such submissions may not include complaints affecting a private 
individual or a specific productive activity, although they may be filed against the 
parties if they fail to enforce their own environmental legislation (Matus and Rossi 
2002:266). In practice, critics allege many of the provisions regarding public 
participation in the agreement have too many weaknesses to be effectively utilised 
(CEDA 2002). The broader point remains valid, however, that excessive focus by 
activists on the larger international issues and events such as Cancún, or summits of the 
Americas, can sometimes distract attention away from important battles over 
provisions in bilateral and sub-regional agreements that attract a lower profile. 
 
 37 
 
 
6. Regional politics  
 
I noted at the start of the paper some of the uniqueness regarding social movements in 
Latin America, or perhaps more pertinently, the way they have been represented in 
academic literatures on the subject. I also noted some elements of trade policy-making 
in Latin America which set it part from equivalent processes in other parts of the world. 
When we add to the mix the uneven process of democratisation in the region, it is 
unsurprising to find that there are also unique and diverse cultures of participation 
across the region. Such national cultures are particularly important to our analysis here 
in the light of the limitations discussed above regarding political opportunity structures 
at regional and international levels vis-à-vis trade policy. It has essentially been left to 
each individual country to decide on appropriate mechanisms of participation, such that 
activists have come to depend again on national structures of decision-making where 
consultations demonstrate ‘very diverse quality’ (Bülow 2003:87). Maintaining and 
strengthening spaces for participation at the national level is seen by NGOs themselves 
as a key way of influencing broader debates about trade policy within the region 
(CEDA 2002).  
 
National Cultures of Participation and Political Opportunity Structures 
 
Across Latin America, different cultures of participation are expressed through state 
institutions which serve to enable or restrict opportunities for civil society engagement 
(see box 2). This is in addition to uneven state capacity to build consensus and to 
construct channels of participation for non-governmental actors (Botto 2003). Weaker 
governments have been shown, in other contexts, to be more open to, and to some 
extent more reliant upon, input from CSOs in trade policy making. The reflections of an 
official from an official from an African trade ministry resonate with the experience of 
poorer states within Latin America where; ‘civil society has demonstrated that they 
have more strong analytical capacity than most government agencies, which don’t have 
the capacity because they don’t have the resources, the time, to engage in trade policy 
analysis’ (quoted in Brock and McGee 2004:46).  
 
In North America, channels of participation have tended to be more institutionalised, 
while in Latin America they have been more informal and more restricted to private 
interests with a direct stake in trade negotiations. The pace at which channels have been 
opened up to civil society participation has also been varied across Latin America with 
Mexico leading the way, followed by Chile, Costa Rica, Brazil and Peru and finally 
Argentina (Botto 2003). Trade policy is in many ways then, grafted onto existing 
patterns of regional and national decision-making and interest group representation 
(Aravena y Pey 2003; Natal y González 2003; Botelho 2003; Guiñazú 2003). It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that decision-making on the relationship between trade and 
environmental issues is affected by these broader dynamics (Bülow 2003). 
 
The political opportunity structures available to groups are affected by the degree of 
institutional embeddedness of environmental issues. The degree of development of 
national environmental policy supported by an effective bureaucracy appears to be a 
key shaper of access and influence for different environmental groups. In the context of 
Mercosur, for example, while Brazil has a more extensive and well-established 
framework for environmental protection, the level of environmental protection in 
Argentina is relatively under-developed, whereas in Paraguay the problem is one of a 
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more generalised lack of political institutionalisation according to Hochstetler 
(2003:7). Relatedly, Brazil also has available many more institutional opportunities 
favourable to civil society participation. For example, environmentalists are 
represented on government councils that determine environmental regulations and 
evaluate environmental impact assessments. This may account for the way in which the 
Brazilian government was more responsive to the arguments and demands advanced by 
environmental activists than the other countries that were more sensitive to the 
demands of economic actors. Teubal and Rodriguez (2002) imply an ideological 
component to these differences of position, suggesting that the government of Brazil is 
more willing to defend social sectors within the country compared with Argentina, 
which has embraced more wholeheartedly the ideology of the free market. Yet in so far 
as such ideologies can be separated from institutional structures of participation, they 
may reflect the outlook of particular administrations, which are of course subject to 
change, as I discuss below. 
 
It is also less clear that these differences always impact upon institutional channels 
available on trade policy specifically. Hochstetler (2003a: 216) claims, for example, 
that the Brazilian government has not created new spaces as such for civil society in the 
Mercosur negotiations, even if it remains the case generally that in Argentina and 
Mexico, there are comparatively fewer institutionalised opportunities for participation 
by civil society (Devia 2002). In the case of Argentina, this is true despite constitutional 
changes in 1994 that have become the focus of NGO campaigning by groups such as 
FARN for access to information on environmental matters. Pressure from civil society 
can of course encourage governments to create such structures of participation at the 
national level. Though only an associate member of Mercosur, Chile has created a 
working group on ALCA, in response to demands from Chilean NGOs, which brings 
together social organisations and the chancellor’s office (Casaburi and Zalazar 2001) 
(see box 1).  
 
The approach a government takes both to environmental issues and to the question of 
civil society participation also appears to be subject to the whims of party political 
differences. At the level of individual administrations, priorities can change with an 
impact on the profile of environmental issues and the resources committed to tackling 
them, such as happened when Argentina’s Fernando de la Rua lowered the status of the 
Environmental Secretariat in 1999. Conversely, in Chile, greater efforts have been 
made to consult with civil society groups on trade policy under the socialist 
administration of Ricardo Lagos (Botto 2003:252). In terms of both priority attached to 
the environment and participation of activists in policy, much is expected of Lula’s PT 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores) government in Brazil, brought to power with the backing 
of many populist and interest groups opposed to ALCA and further regional 
integration. As Hochstetler (2003:25) notes, ‘the PT will have a hard time ignoring the 
nearly 100 percent rejection of the FTAA by its social base’. Compromise will no doubt 
be the outcome. Petras and Morley (1990: 176), speculating on the electoral success of 
PT in Brazil before they came to power, suggested; ‘Insofar as the political leaders of 
the PT, participating in the electoral process, gain access to state office and become 
members of the political class, they inevitably become enmeshed in the commitments 
and constraints of existing state power….The PT today stands between the class 
demands of the movements and the pressures of the institutional and economic 
powers’. Lula’s thinly veiled criticism of the World Social Forum at a speech given at 
the event recently, calling it an ‘ideological fair’ (Clarín 28/10/04), when previously he 
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was greeted at such events as something of a leader of the movements, is perhaps 
suggestive of this tension in practice.  
 
Box 2: National Models of Participation 
 
The Dominican Republic has set up a CCSC (consultative council for civil society) 
to coordinate discussions on WTO and ALCA related matters. Civil society groups 
have been less active than business groups in the council, complaining of a lack of 
information about the process and suggesting that the complexity of the negotiations 
makes it hard for them to link the negotiations to their core work.  
 
Chile was the first country in Latin America to institutionalise the participation of 
business groups and to open dialogue with civil society specifically around the ALCA 
negotiations (Botto 2003). It has created a working group on ALCA in response to 
demands from Chilean NGOs which brings together social organisations and the 
chancellor’s office (Casaburi and Zalazar 2001). 
 
Mexico set up a ‘Consejo Consultivo del Acuerdo Comerical’ inviting participation 
from the private sector, academia, unions and campesino groups, though not 
specifically for ALCA. Its principal function has been to inform these groups, but also 
to build consensus and support for trade policy. The body is said to exclude those 
groups, including environmentalists, opposed to the government’s position (Botto 
2003). 
 
In Brazil, the opening of official channels of participation was part of a broader 
restructuring of the state. Initiatives have included the creation of a web page on the 
internet aimed at improving the exchange of information, regional consultations and 
the construction of new spaces (though voluntary) in the inter-ministerial thematic  
groups working on trade issues (Botto 2003). 
 
Though the last of the countries to open up channels of participation to civil society, 
the Chancellor in Argentina has set up a consultative council for civil society (CCSC) 
to encourage communication between government staff involved in the ALCA and 
Mercosur negotiations and civil society groups interested in international trade issues 
in which Argentina is involved (Walsh 2003:41). A web site has been set up to share 
summaries and materials discussed at the meetings. This committee has met a dozen 
times, always in Buenos Aires, generating concerns about the under-representation of 
groups from the ‘interior’ (Ricco 2004). There is also a Consejo de Comercio 
Internacional which brings together government officials and representatives from 
the business and academic sectors. 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic politics also play a major role here. I noted, in the discussion on Mercosur, 
how environmental groups had been kept away from the key centres of 
decision-making by virtue of weak connections to the trade ministries that wield most 
authority in these debates. Influence they have been able to exert with environmental 
ministries has not extended beyond those ministries because of their isolation within 
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overall government decision-making. If access to powerful parts of the state is 
important, access to key states in the negotiations is even more so.  
 
The domestic politics of the most powerful actors in trade negotiations determine in 
significant ways the extent to which the influence of groups working within those 
countries is internationalised and has impacts disproportionate to their representational 
and resource base. For example, Mayer (2002:98) shows; ‘The nature of the US 
political system, particularly the need for the Congress to approve trade agreements and 
the Congress’s sensitivity to external pressures (i.e lobby groups), created a strategic 
opportunity for environmental groups to exercise their new found leverage’. In other 
words, the relative weakness of political parties and the relative strength of interest 
groups in the US make the US Congress particularly responsive to outside political 
pressure. This was true of NAFTA and, as noted above, will provide veto opportunities 
for an ALCA deal that does not include environmental provisions, despite the current 
lack of attention to these. The domestic politics of the U.S also illustrate the importance 
of timing in combination with the availability of these institutional channels. The 
environmental community in the U.S, or more precisely certain elements within it, were 
able to use the opportunity provided by Clinton’s election, together with a general tide 
of opposition to NAFTA, to extract environmental concessions through the side 
agreement that otherwise may not have been achieved. 
 
Disparities in access to national processes also have knock-on implications for the 
possibilities of regional influence, often serving to magnify disparities in voice and 
profile. Bülow (2003:84) suggests, for example, in the case of the Miami summit, that 
while extensive processes of consultation were available to groups in the U.S and 
Canada, no such inputs were permissible for groups from Argentina, Chile, Mexico or 
Brazil. Within Mexico for example, the President’s Office has never explicitly 
addressed the question of trade and environment and within the NAFTA discussions 
Mexican negotiators worked hard to limit side agreement provisions regarding 
transparency, public participation and public access to information (Alanis-Ortega and 
González-Lutzenkirchen 2002).  
 
The concern of the Mexican government, as with other governments in the region, is 
that creating participatory structures at regional level that only better resourced and 
well-networked groups will be able to take advantage of, serves to reproduce the 
over-representation of North-American concerns and the under-representation of the 
agendas of Latin American groups. In other words, opening up channels at the 
international level allows ‘two bites at the apple’ for those groups that are vocal and 
well-mobilised at the national and international level (Wilkinson 2002:208). The 
counter-claim is that it is the very lack of representation at the national level that makes 
entry points at the international level democratically important. If things are left for 
states to work out with their own civil societies, similar patterns of inequity and access 
will no doubt get reproduced, where those groups that are already powerful and have 
both good relations and institutionalised channels of access to government will be able 
to make their voices heard and those that do not will remain on the margins. State 
discretion to include also implies discretion to exclude. 
 
Beneath these debates about the appropriateness of participation in trade policy within 
the region, often lie more fundamental concerns, that new mechanisms will allow the 
U.S, in the case of ALCA, or Brazil, in the case of Mercosur, to amplify and reinforce 
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their positions within the negotiations via civil society groups from their countries 
lending their weight to calls for improved environmental provisions, for example. As 
noted above, a repeated concern in the Mercosur negotiations has been Brazil’s ability 
to gain a competitive advantage by raising the environmental performance 
requirements for businesses across the region, given the relative advancement of its 
own environmental policy. The preference instead has been for lowest common 
denominator ‘downward harmonisation’. Likewise, within the context of ALCA, there 
is a suspicion that the insertion of environmental provisions is driven by the U.S as a 
device to offset a potential loss of competitiveness through practices of environmental 
dumping or to create forms of eco-protectionism (Bülow 2003). The possibility of 
alliances between groups, and the development of coherent agendas that adequately 
express the concerns of groups across North and South America, is disabled by these 
broader politics of trade and the place of the environment within those politics, as we 
will see below.  
 
The Regional Politics of Mobilisation 
 
Regional dynamics are also important to understanding the politics of mobilisation; the 
agendas around which groups cohere and the possibilities of transnational cooperation. 
There has been a general asymmetry in participation during the ALCA summits, where 
there has been a much stronger presence for environmentalists from North America 
than from organisations from Latin America (Bülow 2003: 84). There are also, of 
course, differences of priority. NWF, NRDC, NAS, as with NAFTA, were pushing for 
an environmental side agreement, while the FFL (Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano) 
of Latin American organisations attached less importance to environmental issues. 
There have also been tensions among U.S groups about their role in the preparations for 
the summit, with privileged roles for groups such as WRI often at the expense of others 
previously used to extensive consultation. These dynamics reflect the experience 
during the NAFTA negotiations and the broader politics of transnational collaboration 
that characterised that process, described above. Despite differences of emphasis, there 
has been common ground among groups across the region on the need for enhanced 
transparency in the deliberations in the run up to and during the summits of the 
Americas and for improvements in mechanisms for the participation of civil society. 
This is reflected, for example, in the document ‘Without effective citizen participation, 
there cannot be sustainable development’ (Bülow 2003:85) [also see box 3 below].  
 
Demands around civil society participation have continued to be made through the 
Peoples’ Summits that led to the ASC (la Alianza Social Continental), a network, 
officially founded in 1999, of those groups most critical of the summits of the 
Americas, and of ALCA in particular. Over the course of the summits of the Americas 
ASC has been strengthened by groups’ frustration with the lack of openings within 
formal processes and the failure to meaningfully act on the promising rhetoric 
regarding civil society participation that peppered early ministerial drafts.19 Differences 
of emphasis on key issues remain, however. On the environment, differences over the 
nature of the relationship between sustainable development and free trade have 
persisted, reflecting the broader ideological divisions discussed above, as well as some 
fractures along North-South lines. Other fault lines include disagreements over 
                                                          
19  Korzeniewicz and Smith (2003) show summit by summit how the relationship between 
insiders and outsiders and within the ASC has changed over the course of the negotiations. 
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subsidies and protection for agriculture and sectors like steel and textiles, as well as the 
role of environmental and labour rules. At times, such differences were amplified by 
conflicts between protest cultures which bring together groups of such divergent social 
profiles as middle class students and campesino groups (Ruben 2004). 
 
Some of these differences appear to be subsumed within umbrella coalitions that 
imitate those formed around the time of the NAFTA negotiations, such as La Alianza 
por un Commercio Justo y Responsable20. Agreement has also been possible within the 
ASC on the core themes of official recognition of the social fora and inclusion on the 
official agenda of issues of labour rights, human rights and the environment (Botto and 
Tussie 2003:41). At the summit of Santiago in 1999 the ASC was able to generate a 
document, following a series of workshops on key themes, laying out alternatives to the 
programmes being promoted within ALCA. What emerged was ‘Alternativas para las 
Américas: Hacia la construcción de un acuerdo hemisférico de los pueblos’. 
 
The fact that Brazil is the most reticent of the Latin American countries about ALCA, is 
perhaps reflected by the fact its civil society groups are the most active from the region 
within the ASH (Alianza Social Continental). Groups that have been involved in the 
politics of previous regional trade agreements such as NAFTA, including La Red 
Mexicana de Accíon Frente al Libre Comerico, are also active within the alliance. ASC 
also maintains links to other networks that cover different sectors and issues such as 
campesino concerns. An example would be the Coordinadora Latinoamericana de 
Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC), a regional network based in Quito Ecuador that 
coordinates the work of organisations working with campesinos, indigenous 
communities and rural worker and small producer organisations (Korzeniewicz and 
Smith 2003). 21  The meeting point with broader ASC agendas is issues such as 
economic justice, food sovereignty and sustainable agricultural development.  
 
With attempts to construct regionally relevant and effective campaigns on ALCA, 
given the economic disparities between the countries of the region the agreement 
covers, the diverse traditions of campaigning that exist, and the uneven degrees of 
institutionalisation of the issues it addresses, we would expect to find evidence of many 
of the tensions and relations that characterise global NGO campaigns. In particular 
perhaps, the issues of representation, power and accountability that they raise. There 
are important lessons to be learned here for South American activists. Chiriboga 
(2001:74), for example, suggests that; ‘The experience of Southern NGOs in global 
campaigning up until the 1990s had been limited to providing project information and 
political legitimacy to campaigns designed, structured and developed in the North and 
directed toward an audience of Northern government decision-makers’. There was 
some sense in which campaigns around NAFTA reproduced this dynamic. Tussie and 
Tuozzo (2001:115) also posit a warning, and a challenge at the same time, when they 
suggest ‘NGO coalitions tend to reproduce the hegemony of the global North. Northern 
                                                          
20  National networks by this name also exist. In Chile for example ACJR (La Alianza Chilena 
por un Comerico Justo y Responsable) was created by a range of groups critical of the 
Pinochet-led model of neo-liberal restructuring (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003:55). In the 
ALCA context it has pushed for the incorporation of social and environmental clauses. In 
Brazil, there is La Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos (Rebrip) which advances a 
similar agenda through good links to the PT. 
21  Key members include groups such as La Associación de Organizaciones Campesinas 
Centroamericanas para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo.  
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NGOs often steer the direction of the coalition, partly because they control the 
management of resources, but also because they have more influence over the 
definition of the campaign’s goals and agenda’. Korzeniewicz and Smith (2003:62) 
suggest such a dynamic has been an issue within the ASC with some southern groups 
claiming that their northern counterparts have used advantages in experience and 
access to governments to advance national and sectoral interests under the guise of a 
common, alliance-wide position. Creating spaces within coalitions which bring 
together groups with often competing agendas, and with huge disparities in access to 
resources and networks of influence, will be an enormous challenge for future 
campaigns around ALCA. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
‘A significant step toward a comprehensive trade and environment policy in FTAA 
negotiations is recognition that the old, exclusive and secretive deal-making process of 
trade negotiations must give way to an inclusive, transparent and democratic process.. 
The era of international trade negotiations being insulated from public concerns, 
including respect for the environment, is over’ (Caldwell 2002:296). 
 
We have learned that top-down mechanisms of participation in trade policy often serve 
to reinforce inequities and dichotomies within civil society. In the run up to ministerial 
meetings of ALCA, for example, space was made available for academics, think-tanks 
and consultants and not other elements within civil society. There is also a degree of 
political screening at work here in so far as these groups play a key role in consensus 
building because these actors, while perhaps disagreeing on the roadmaps to get there, 
support the basic principles of market liberalisation (Botto and Tussie 2003:42). Given 
this, it is perhaps unsurprising that attempts to construct virtual mechanisms of 
engagement where groups can deposit suggestions, were essentially only taken up by 
these same actors; academics, business foundations and a sprinkling of NGOs 
principally from North and Central America. As noted above, many were sceptical of 
the value of engaging with initiatives such as this when there was no way of monitoring 
the impact of the proposals. This was compounded by the lack of effort on the part of 
many Latin American governments to make people aware at national level of those 
spaces and opportunities that do exist for engagement (Botto and Tussie 2003:43). 
 
There is a delicate balance to strike between attempting to construct ambitious 
mechanisms of consultation on a hemispheric, or even regional basis, and focussing 
attention on improving national mechanisms of consultation that, in the final instance, 
is where responsibility resides for considering the public interest in the formulation of 
trade policy (CIECA 2002). As we have seen, groups with poor access to national 
decision-making structures often value openings at regional level to make their voices 
heard. Ensuring that they are in a position to exploit those openings means overcoming 
barriers they face in terms of funding to attend meetings and the personnel implications 
of stretching often small staffs even further by engaging in regional processes. As noted 
above, those who benefit most from participatory mechanisms in regional trade accords 
appear to be those that also have open to them channels of influence at national level, 
hence the concern about getting ‘two bites of the apple’.  
 
I noted in the introduction a wide range of reasons, strategic and principled, why 
opening up trade policy to a plurality of voices and interests makes sense, even from the 
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point of view of trade negotiators not traditionally accustomed to sharing 
decision-making authority with others. Hence, whilst trade policy makers may lack the 
ability (or willingness) to address issues of capacity within civil society, in order to 
ensure that groups can make the most of those channels of engagement that do exist, 
they can at least work to ensure that mechanisms are in place for diverse groups to be 
represented in policy arenas that, despite the rhetoric, remain relatively closed and 
inaccessible to non-economic interest groups and elites. 
 
Reflection on these mechanisms, and for whom they work best, may, perhaps should, 
prompt broader reflection about the way in which regional and international policy is 
made. Some writers have called for the development of mechanisms which invoke the 
principle of subsidiarity, in order to enable decision-making at lower levels of authority 
where participation from a broader, and importantly less well-resourced, spectrum of 
actors, is more realistic. While this has been the subject of environmental debates at the 
international level (Newell 2002), Leis and Viola (ud) propose the SGT of Mercosur as 
an appropriate venue to consider changes to decision-making based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. This would imply a multi-level governance system of jurisdiction, where 
decisions get taken at the level most appropriate to the nature and scale of the problem, 
given also considerations of cost and efficiency, but with a presumption in favour of 
taking decisions at the lowest level possible. Given the patterns of elite domination 
described above, where even parliaments are often denied real decision-making 
authority, it is certainly worth exploring further the advantages and disadvantages of 
such institutional innovations aimed at democratising the decision-making process.  
 
 
 45 
 
 
Box 3: Reform proposals include: 
• The right of the public to review and comment on the written record of future trade 
disputes 
• Access to working documents…providing citizens with information they need to 
make sound and informed choices about policies that affect their future. Defining 
information disclosure policies and the de-restriction of relevant documents 
(country position papers, draft text, preliminary and official agendas, schedules of 
meetings, contact information for national representatives). 
• Establish a verifiable avenue for public comments on the activities of each FTAA 
negotiating group. Clear and measurable procedures that indicate how civil 
society concerns will be addressed within the context of the negotiations. 
• Meetings with different sectors of civil society where negotiators explain in detail 
proposals on key issues that affect different sectors. Such consultations should be 
open before, during and after the negotiations. 
• A permanent role for NGOs in future FTAA activities.  
• The creation of a Civil Society Forum parallel to the ministerial meetings with the 
power to present its conclusions to the ministers or a Social Forum on Integration 
(Foro Social de Interación) with a permanent, independent institutional status 
within the negotiations.  
• Designate public participation as a specific overall trade negotiation objective. 
• The creation of committees for civil society participation at the national level to 
evaluate and monitor trade agreements. 
• The creation of a work plan to overcome the obstacles that currently restrict 
citizen participation including an information clearing house, national advisory 
committees, the promotion of research, training and capacity building and funding 
for direct participation in negotiations.  
• The performance of the civil society committee within FTAA should be given as 
high priority as the FTAA’s other commitees such as the Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TNC) or the sectoral working groups. 
(Caldwell 2002; CEDA 2002; ONGs Chilenos 2003; CIECA 2002). 
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